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INCAPACITATING ERRORS: SENTENCING AND THE SCIENCE
OF CHANGE
M. EVE HANANt
ABSTRACT
Despite widespread support for shifting sentencing policy from
"tough on crime" to "smart on crime," reflected in legislation like the fed-
eral First Step Act, the scope of criminal justice reform has been limited.
We continue to engage in practices that permanently incapacitate people
deemed to be hardened or habitual criminals, while carving out only lim-
ited niches of sentencing reform for special groups like first-time, nonvi-
olent offenders and adolescents. We cannot, however, be "smart on crime"
without a theory of punishment that supports second chances for the broad-
est range of people convicted of crimes.
This Article posits that the cultural belief that adults do not change
poses a major impediment to "smart on crime" policies. Current sentenc-
ing policies focus on long-term incapacitation of adults with criminal rec-
ords because of our folk belief that adult personality traits are immutable.
Whereas adolescents are expected to mature over time, and thus can rarely
be determined to require permanent incapacitation, adults lack the benefit
of the presumption of change.
Standing in contrast to our folk belief that adults do not change is a
growing body of neuroscientific and psychological literature that this Ar-
ticle refers to as, "the science of adult change," which demonstrates that
adult brains change in response to environmental prompts and experience.
The science of adult change has powerful implications for punish-
ment theory and practice. In its broadest sense, the science of adult change
supports an empirically grounded, normative claim that sentencing should
not attempt to identify the true criminal to permanently exclude him. Ra-
ther, sentencing policy should engage in only modest predictions about
future behavior. The presumption of reintegration as a full member of so-
ciety should be the norm. Moreover, because adult change occurs in re-
sponse to environmental stimuli, the science of adult change supports both
public accountability for the conditions of confinement and, ultimately, a
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challenge to incarceration as our primary means of responding to social
harm.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal punishment in the United States often results in the perma-
nent exclusion of the convicted person from society.' Sentences for incar-
ceration are longer than in other Western countries.2 At least one-sixth of
U.S. prisoners have been incarcerated for over ten years.3 An estimated
200,000 people are currently serving a life sentence or its equivalent.4 Ex-
clusionary sentencing practices extend beyond the prison walls to a multi-
tude of collateral consequences. 5 Practices that prevent people with crim-
inal convictions from living in public housing, obtaining professional li-
censes, and participating in other aspects of society limit their participation
in civic life and, thus, thwart any meaningful reintegration into society.6
1. Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S
NEw DEATH PENALTY 96, 97 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) ("[T]he American
carceral system, once to some extent at least rhetorically committed to reintegration ... has come ex-
plicitly to embrace the opposite approach, that of permanent exclusion.").
2. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA'S INCREASING USE OF
LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 5 (2017) (stating one out of nine people in prison is serving a life
sentence, and one out of every seven people in prison is serving either a life or virtual life sentence).
3. U.S. DEP'T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU JUST. STAT., NATIONAL CORRECTIONS
REPORTING PROGRAM, 1991-2015: SELECTED VARIABLES (ICPSR 36862) (2018).
4. NELLIS, supra note 2.
5. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 115-16.
6. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Convic-
tion, 160 U. PENN. L. REv. 1789, 1800-01 (2012) (discussing how collateral consequences like voter
disenfranchisement, restrictions on public employment and professional licensing, and registration
requirements bear many of the hallmarks of "civil death," because they exclude convicted people from
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Other scholars have described these exclusionary practices as a sys-
tem of "total incapacitation," 7 "permanent exclusion,"8 and "banish-
ment." 9 Exclusionary practices can serve retributive and deterrent func-
tions, but their hallmark is that they are designed to protect public safety
through incapacitating the offender.'o Indeed, in the early 1990s, Attorney
General William P. Barr advanced a purely incapacitative model of crime
reduction, arguing that incapacitation through imprisonment was the most
effective way to ensure public safety." Incapacitation as a justification for
exclusionary punishments is, thus, a central area of concern and the focus
of this Article.
In the political sphere, efforts have been made to identify certain
groups of people convicted of crimes who do not pose a long-term public
safety risk or otherwise appear to merit a second chance. Examples of leg-
islative efforts designed to meet these goals have increased in recent years
through Justice Reinvestment Initiatives at the state level' 2 and the federal
First Step Act.13 Other examples of reform designed to remove the non-
dangerous from exclusion-which I will discuss at length in Part I-aim
to disentangle children and adolescents from adult prison, with its danger-
ous conditions and long sentences.14
Scholarly criticism of the reform efforts has included doubt about the
accuracy and fairness of risk assessment instruments. '5 Additionally, there
important aspects of civic life); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Conse-
quences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 127-28, 190
(2009) (discussing the severity of collateral consequences such as exclusion from public housing and
restrictions from professional licensing within the context of professional responsibility and ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims).
7. Jonathon Simon, How We Punish Murder, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, n.50 (2011) (discussing
life sentences and "total incapacitation").
8. Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Controll in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
259, 309 (2011) (describing life sentences as "permenant exclusion").
9. Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures ofPunishment, 68 STAN. L. REv. 933, 948 (2016) (describ-
ing prison as "banishment within territorial limits").
10. See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 41-42 (2014); see also Malcolm
M. Feeley & Jonathon Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and
Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 458 (1992); Robert Weisberg, Barrock Lecture: Reality Chal-
lenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1241 (2012) (describing retribution as
the "stock story" of sentencing, while incapacitation is the actual, driving force and goal).
11. See WILLIAM P. BARR, U.S. DEP'T JUST., THE CASE FOR MORE INCARCERATION 1 (1992)
(arguing that "[p]risons work" by incapacitating people who commit crimes, regardless of whether
they serve deterrent or rehabilitative functions. The influential policy paper at no point mentioned
retributivism as a goal of incarceration).
12. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 35 STATES REFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES THROUGH
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT (2018) (reporting that thirty-five states enacted Justice Reinvestment Initia-
tives between 2007 and 2018 to reduce prison populations and, thus, prison spending and to redirect
the funds to community-based sanctions).
13. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (including provi-
sions designed to prepare for reintegration into society, such as time-credit for good behavior, reha-
bilitative programming in prisons, and housing prisoners closer to their home communities so that they
can maintain relationships with family).
14. See JULIA DURNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., STATE-LED JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS
IMPROVEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS AND EARLY OUTCOMES 3 (2018).
15. See, e.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 85 (2018) (critiquing the "off-
label" use of actuarial risk assessment in sentencing decisions).
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is general concern that legislative efforts to provide a second chance do
too little, skimming only a small percentage of convicted people out of a
deep ocean of incapacitative imprisonment, state supervision, and exclu-
sionary practices.16 The beneficiaries of the reforms are most often those
whom Marie Gottschalk calls the "non, non, nons"-"nonviolent, nonse-
rious, and nonsexual offenders."l 7 In other words, the beneficiaries appear
to be only those who could not be imagined to pose any potential safety
risk.
Further criticism has noted that the reform efforts do nothing to chal-
lenge a central assumption of American punishment: that many people
who commit crimes are characterologically criminal and incapable of
change.' 8 Theories aiming to explain the U.S. attitude toward people who
commit crimes as characterologically criminal have suggested the role of
the unique features of U.S. history. Specifically, scholars have argued that
both the absence of dignity discourse that Europe absorbed from the age
of nobility" and the legacy of white supremacist myths of black danger-
ousness used to justify subordination from slavery onward, have played
roles in the development of U.S. folk beliefs about criminality.2 0
While many intriguing and urgent questions about the purpose and
practice of punishment are raised by mass incarceration and current reform
efforts,2' I focus this Article on the problem in our conceptualization of
the characterological criminal who is incapable of change. The concept of
the characterological criminal underlies the impulse to permanently inca-
pacitate. I argue that the characterological criminal is a creation of folk
beliefs about the permanence of character, personality, and behavior in
adulthood. Until these folk beliefs are empirically challenged and cor-
rected, we will see only minor tinkering around the edges of sentencing
reform.
16. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 S.M.U. L. REV. 189, 211(2013) (char-
acterizing neorehabilitation as a pragmatic approach to reducing costs by finding alternatives to incar-
ceration for a class of defendant considered to be statistically unlikely to reoffend).
17. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 165 (2015).
18. Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures ofPunishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933,941 (2016) ("Implicit
in American punishment is the idea that serious or repeat offenses mark the offenders as morally de-
formed people rather than ordinary people who have committed crimes.").
19. For a discussion of dignity in Europe and American, see JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 101 (2003).
20. For a discussion of U.S. white supremacy in the construction of the myth of Black crimi-
nality, see Brief for the National Black Law Students Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
at 5-8, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049) (citing GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY
1817-1914 (1987)) (discussing the racialized construct of criminal dangerousness); see also KHALIL
GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS 3-4 (2010); M. Eve Hanan, Remorse
Bias, 83 Mo. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (2018) (asserting the racialized myth of characterological criminal-
ity results in implicit bias against crediting the remorse expressed by Black defendants at sentencing).
21. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV.
259, 261-62 (2018).
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The practice of deciding who should be incapacitated, and for how
long, rests less on data and more on popular beliefs about why people do
what they do, sometimes referred to as "folk psychology." 2 2 Folk psychol-
ogy is defined as how we imagine one another, particularly how we imag-
ine the inner worlds of one another.23 It encompasses all of our ordinary,
nonprofessional, "implicit theories about a variety of human attributes," 2 4
including bases for our predictions about human thought and behavior. 2 5
Folk psychology influences how we think about crime and punish-
ment. 26 Deciding guilt and setting punishment in criminal cases has his-
torically relied on common intuitions about thinking and behavior. Jurors
apply a common sense approach to judging the defendant's state of mind
and the reasonableness of defense claims.2 7 And judges, while fortified
with risk assessment instruments and sentencing guidelines, ultimately
take a common sense approach to setting punishment in accordance with
their goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.28
The folk beliefs at work in the conceptualization of the charactero-
logically criminal are: (1) that actions demonstrate character; (2) that
adults do not change; and, thus (3) that we can accurately predict danger-
ousness based on a person's past actions. This set of beliefs around the
permanence of adult traits and behavior undergirds the practice of perma-
nently excluding people who have previously committed crimes. Consider
the idea of a "habitual offender" or a "career criminal." 2 9 Both designa-
tions-particularily when used in sentencing enhancements to impose life
22. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Eve-
rything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 1775, 1776 (2004).
23. See Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Prom-
ise ofNeuroscience, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 39,40 (2015) (arguing that neuroscience should not undermine
criminal law's commitment to treating people as free agents when they commit crimes); see also Deb-
orah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 334 (2017). While the idea of free
agency is hotly debated historically, and in light of the new neuroscience, I do not address questions
of intent and responsibility in this Article. I note, though, that neuroscience is not the first challenge
to folk psychology's claim of free agency. Determinism has long posited that, because every action
must have a cause, our actions must be the product of other actions that predetermine them, no matter
how vividly we experience the sensation of choice.
24. David Scott Yeager et al., The Far-Reaching Effects of Believing People Can Change: Im-
plicit Theories of Personality Shape Stress, Health, and Achievement During Adolescence, 106 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 867, 868 (2014) (studying the effect of implicit views on whether
people change on stress, health, and achievement among high school freshman).
25. See Morse, supra note 23, at 72. Even scholars critical of law's overexuberant embrace of
neuroscience tentatively support the idea that neuroscience may demonstrate that some rules, doc-
trines, and policy in criminal law are based on incorrect folk beliefs about human thinking and behav-
ior.
26. Green & Cohen, supra note 22.
27. Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law,
25 LAW & PHIL. 571, 598 (2006).
28. See id.
29. Both the terms "habitual offender" and "career criminal" appear in descriptions of sentenc-
ing enhancement statutes that have been upheld-in whole or in part-by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (invalidating the residual clause of the federal
Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 286 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's holding that Texas' "habitual offender" statute
did not violate the cruel and unusual punishments prohibition of the Eighth Amendment as applied to
a defendant sentenced to life in prison for a third, nonviolent offense).
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sentences for nonviolent, repeat offenses-connote a judgment that the
person convicted is characterologically criminal.
Yet a growing body of scientific literature, derived from diverse
fields of science, suggests that people continue to change throughout adult-
hood depending, in part, on external stimuli. At least two findings from
what I will call "the science of adult change" have sentencing implica-
tions.3 0 First, people keep changing throughout life and, thus, continue to
be capable of growth.3 1 Second, changes in adult brains are dependent on
external stimuli, including environment and new experiences.32
Stated generally, the claim that adults change may not seem particu-
larly revelatory, but rather, confirms what might be observed anecdotally.
Many neuroscientists point out, however, that potential for adult change
was grossly underestimated before the discovery of neuroplasticity. 33 And,
to the extent that neuroscientific images may be confirmatory rather than
revelatory, 34 they still profoundly impact an understanding of how people
change.
The science of adult change has several important implications for
exclusionary punishments. First, we may incapacitate people long after
they pose a threat to public safety. Sentencing policy should be reconsid-
ered to account for human change over time. Second, because adult brains
change in response to environmental stimuli, prison conditions can be un-
derstood to directly "rewire" the brains of incarcerated people, often in
ways that are ruinous and that frustrate rehabilitative and even deterrent
goals. This suggests a principle of sentencing that embodies public ac-
countability for the conditions of punishment.
It is essential to empirically challenge the goals of punishment prac-
tices to reform criminal justice. When we talk about the traditional goals
of punishment-retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion-we are often engaging in a theoretical universe that ignores "the
stubborn facts of a system of imprisonment they often justify or enable." 35
The science of adult change presents an empirical challenge to current in-
capacitative practices and also reframes questions of rehabilitation. Insofar
as empirical challenges demonstrate that punishment theory is inade-
quate,3 6 the science of adult change also suggests principles that could un-
dergird future punishment theories.
30. See discussed in infra Part II.
31. See discussed in infra Part II.
32. See discussed in infra Part II.
33. See discussed in infra Part II.
34. Morse, supra note 23, at 66-67 (discussing the use of neuroscience in Roper v. Simmons,
which banned the death penalty for juveniles, Morse asks what the neuroscience could tell the court
that we do not already know from observing children's behavior).
35. Weisberg, supra note 10, at 1204-08.
36. Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity is the New Legitimacy, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
311, 316 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoffeds., 2017) (noting the need for a new "set of prin-
ciples for thinking about the harms of order maintenance.").
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I discuss in Part I how developmental science influenced both the
U.S. Supreme Court and lawmakers in many states to limit life sentences
for juveniles. Although children are certainly different from adults in im-
portant ways, I arge that a careful examination of how science was used to
dispel the folk notion of the incorrigible child "superpredator" reveals im-
portant and underconsidered parallels to adult sentencing.3 7 Specifically,
the shift from "superpredator" to a developmental science approach in ju-
venile law exemplifies the type of empirically-driven shift in belief neces-
sary in adult sentencing to counteract the folk belief in the permanence of
adult criminality.
In Part II, I discuss how folk psychology is stubbornly committed to
the idea that adult personality and behavior is fixed. As a consequence,
folk psychology shapes sentencing policy toward the conclusion that
adults who continue to commit criminal acts should be permanently inca-
pacitated. I then describe some of the new scientific research that supports
the claim that adults continue to change through adulthood, particularly in
response to environment.
In Part III, I argue that the continued capacity to change throughout
the lifespan, combined with evidence of the primacy of environmental
stimuli in shaping change, should have broader and more striking applica-
tions to sentencing policy. I suggest two principles that could inform sen-
tencing theory and policy. At its foundation, the science of adult change
should result both in a strong presumption against permanent exclusion
and accountability for the conditions of confinement. In this model, the
state's response to crime should be designed to provide the context that
will support the kind of change that leads to desistance from crime. Poli-
cies should include: reduced reliance on incarceration; shorter sentences;
options for early release from prison; and accountability for the ruinous
conditions of confinement.
I. FROM "SUPERPREDATORS" TO UNFINISHED BRAINS: SCIENCE AND
SENTENCING KIDS
Whether we perceive criminality in a person to be malleable or fixed
is often a pivotal issue at sentencing. Recent shifts in attitudes toward ad-
olescents who commit crimes highlights how pivotal the question of an
individual's capacity to change can be to punishment decisions. To under-
stand the significance of adolescent capacity to change, consider
how it shaped (1) both U.S. Supreme Court's opinions, which barred the
death penalty and limited life without parole for adoles-
cents; and (2) the wave of recent legislation limiting extreme sentences for
37. The idea of a class of children who are "superpredators" appears to have come from an
opinion piece written by a political scientist, who described a hypothetical youth who is impulsive,
remorseless, and able to kill, rape, or maim, without giving it a second thought. John J. Dilulio, Jr.,
Defining Criminality Up, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB836340511566636500 (last
updated July 3, 1996).
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juveniles. 8 The past fifteen years have demonstrated, in the juvenile con-
text, that scientific ideas can modify folk beliefs, thereby reshaping sen-
tencing theory and practice.
Folk beliefs about childhood have traditionally distinguished children
from adults, holding children less blameworthy for their actions and more
capable of change through maturation.3 9 The established cultural norms of
childhood found early expression in the establishment of the juvenile
court.4 0 The Progressive Era's new juvenile courts aimed to fulfill the role
of a parent for wayward children, providing guidance and discipline de-
signed to promote normal maturation away from a life of crime.4 While
juveniles facing delinquency proceedings were increasingly accorded
some of the rights of defendants in criminal trials, the philosophy of juve-
nile court continued to rest on a belief in children's basic goodness, which
is inextricably tied to their capacity to change and reform as they mature.42
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a new folk belief gained ascend-
ency: the belief in the "superpredator."4 3 The "superpredator" is a child
who, through engaging in serious crime, demonstrates that he is perma-
nently incorrigible, uniquely culpable, and incapable of change. Many ex-
amples of children and adolescents deemed "superpredators" were African
American,'44 demonstrating a continuation of racialized concepts of crimi-
nality.45 The result of the "superpredator" construct was a wave of punitive
legislation for adolescents.4 6 Simply labeling children as superpredators
led to more extreme sentences.47 In the 1990s, adult defendants, who were
sentenced more frequently to prison, and for longer prison terms, were
38. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding juveniles whose crimes re-
flect transient immaturity have a substantive right to a meaningful opportunity from release from
prison); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,489 (2012) (holding mandatory life without parole sentences
for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's punishments clause); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010) (holding life without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile of-
fenders violates the Eighth Amendment's punishments clause); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005) (holding death penalty for crimes committed by defendants under the age of eighteen violates
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment's clause).
39. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (describing foundational be-
liefs underlying the informality and paternalism of juvenile court proceedings).
40. See id. at 60.
41. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 4-5 (2011).
42. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835-38 (1988) (plurality opinion); Gault, 387
U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
43. Dilulio, supra note 37.
44. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 408-16 (2017) (asserting other scholars have documented how
myths of Black criminality destroy our ability to see Black children as children. And, this is a clear
function of the "superpredator" myth that led to dramatic increases in (1) charging children as adults;
and (2) sentencing children to adult prisons for extremely long terms of years).
45. Robin Walker Sterling, "Children Are Different": Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the
"New" Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 1044-46 (2013) (tracing the nineteenth
and twentieth century history of treating Black children's disciplinary issues as crimes deserving of
criminal punishment).
46. Id. at 1054-65 (discussing the role of "superpredator" language in increasing transfer of
juveniles to criminal court and imposition of life without parole sentences for adolescent defendants).
47. Birckhead, supra note 44, at 415-16 (noting that other scholars have documented how
myths of Black criminality destroy our ability to see Black children as children).
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joined by children tried as adults as part of a dramatic expansion of the
prison system.4 8
Four U.S. Supreme Court cases can be read as actively grappling with
the folk construct of the "superpredator" and its tension with the traditional
view of children as more capable of change than adults. In Roper v. Sim-
mons, 49 the Supreme Court categorically barred the death penalty for
crimes committed by defendants under the age of eighteen.o In Graham
v. Florida," the Supreme Court categorically barred the imposition of a
life without parole sentence for nonhomicide crimes committed by defend-
ants under the age of eighteen.5 2 In Miller v. Alabama,53 the Supreme Court
held that sentencing courts must consider the "mitigating aspects of youth"
before imposing life without parole sentencing for homicide crimes com-
mitted by defendants under the age of eighteen. 54 In Montgomery v. Ala-
bama,55 the Supreme Court held that Miller is retroactive, thereby empha-
sizing the substantive right of juveniles to certain protections in sentenc-
56mg.
These cases, which are well-trodden territory for legal scholars, ad-
dress several themes in addition to the capacity to change-such as the
adolescent defendant's reduced culpability. 57 For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, I limit my discussion to one aspect of their analysis: how childhood
maturation reduces the need for incapacitative punishment and increases
the likelihood of rehabilitation.
A theme running through U.S. Supreme Court cases on life and death
sentences for adolescents is the acknowledgment of the great difficulty
sentencing courts face when trying to decide whether an adolescent is
characterologically criminal, or manifesting "irreparable corruption."58
Barring the death penalty for juveniles, the Roper Court stated,
If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and ob-
servation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any ju-
venile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude
48. See PARTICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T JUST., TRYING JUVENILES As ADULTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING (2011).
49. 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
50. Id.
51. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
52. Id. at 75.
53. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
54. Id.
55. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
56. Id. at 736.
57. See Rachel E. Barkow, Life without Parole and the Hope for Real Sentencing Reform, in
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 190, 203; Jonathon Si-
mon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to Abolition of Life Without Parole,
in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 282, 285-86; Michael
M. O'Hear, Not Just Kid Stuf]? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1089-
90(2013).
58. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,479-80 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
573 (2005) (discussing difficulty determining which adolescent crime reflects "transient immaturity"
and which crime reflects "irreparable corruption")).
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that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver con-
demnation-that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.59
Likewise, when it barred life without parole sentences for adolescents
convicted of offenses other than homicide in Graham, the Court high-
lighted the expectation that children change as they mature, and, thus, are
entitled to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" through demon-
strated rehabilitation.6 0
In Miller, the Court restated the "great difficulty we noted in Roper
and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between 'the juvenile of-
fender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."' 61 In
Montgomery, which held that the Court's rulings in Miller and Graham
are retroactive, the Court once again emphasized the expectation that chil-
dren mature out of crime and, thus, deserve the opportunity to demonstrate
their rehabilitation. In the Court's clearest statement yet of adolescent ca-
pacity to change, the Montgomery Court stated that "Miller's central intu-
ition" is that "children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of
change."6 2 A theme throughout these four cases is the concern that perma-
nent exclusion through imprisonment or death is not warranted because
children change as they mature. Because they change over time, a decision
at sentencing to permanently exclude them from society is inherently un-
trustworthy and, thus, unwarranted.63
To what extent did developmental psychology and neuroscience m-
fluence the Court's shift away from a belief in the child-as-superpredator
toward the belief in the child as likely to mature out of crime? Citing to
amicus briefs from medical and psychological associations, the Court
noted that neuroscience and behavioral studies confirm structural differ-
ences in children's brains that impact their ability to control impulses and
make well-reasoned decisions. 6 4 The amicus briefs discuss studies that
demonstrate, inter alia, that the adolescent's brain is in flux. The prefrontal
59. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
60. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
61. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573); Graham, 560 US. at 68. Alt-
hough, in Miller, the Court retreated to allow for determinations of permanent incorrigibility, and thus
life without parole, in the rare homicide case. For a discussion of the contradictions of Miller, see
generally Erin Dunn, Montgomery v. Louisiana: An Attempt to Make Juvenile Life Without Parole a
Practical Impossibility, 32 TOURO L. REV. 679 (2016).
62. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
63. See id.
64. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
*14-*15, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) (citing B.J. Casey et al.,
The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 65-68 (2008)).
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cortex of the adolescent brain continues to develop throughout adoles-
cence.6 ' The prefrontal cortex is essential for assessing risk;6 6 evaluating
rewards; 67 controlling impulses; 6 8 evaluating consequences accurately and
making related decisions; 69 assessing the truthfulness of others; 7 0 manag-
ing and utilizing working memory; 71 responding to feedback; 7 2 and mak-
ing decisions based on moral values. 73 Out of these studies emerges a con-
cept of the adolescent-and even the adolescent who has committed a se-
rious crime-as not only less culpable but also as unformed and full of
hidden capacity to grow. The developmental psychology and neuroscience
rebutted the idea of the "superpredator"-the child whose actions demon-
strate he is essentially not a child, both in terms of decision-making and
capacity to change.
In this regard, using brain imaging technologies to demonstrate the
structures and processes of adolescent brains was not transformational.
Rather, the neuroscience and, in particular, neuroimaging of adolescent
brains, functioned like the first photograph of the earth taken from space.
Like the iconic "Blue Marble Shot" of the earth that persuaded many peo-
ple to imagine themselves as global citizens, being able to see a neu-
roimage of the undeveloped frontal lobes of an adolescent brain confirmed
what was long obvious to parents and teachers: adolescents have less ca-
pacity for decision-making. Choices made at age fifteen do not reflect who
the adolescent will become in the future. The neuroimaging reinforces our
65. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *16-18 (citing Samantha B.
Wright et al., Neural Correlates of Fluid Reasoning in Children and Adults, I FRONTIERS HUMAN
NEUROSCI., No. 8, 2008, at 7 (finding that important changes in the prefrontal cortex during adoles-
cence lead to the development of logical reasoning abilities)).
66. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *16-17 (citing Facundo Ma-
nes et al., Decision-Making Processes Following Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex, 125 BRAIN 624
(2002)).
67. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *16-17 (citing J. O'Doherty
et al., Abstract Reward and Punishment Representations in the Human Orbitofrontal Cortex, 4
NATURE NEUROSCI. 95 (2001); Robert D. Rogers et al., Choosing Between Small, Likely Rewards and
Large, Unlikely Rewards Activates Inferior and Orbital Prefrontal Cortex, 20 J. NEUROSCI. 9029
(1999)).
68. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *ll7 (citing Antoine Be-
chara et al., Characterization ofthe Decision-Making Deficit ofPatients with Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2198-99 (2000)).
69. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *17 (citing Wright et al.,
supra note 65 (finding that important changes in the prefrontal cortex during adolescence lead to the
development of logical reasoning abilities)).
70. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *17 (citing D. D. Langleben
et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception. An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance
Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002)).
71. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *17 (citing Beatrice Luna,
The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-
DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 249, 264 (Francisco Aboitiz & Diego Cosmelli eds., 2009)).
72. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *17 (citing R. Elliott et al.,
Differential Neural Response to Positive and Negative Feedback in Planning and Guessing Tasks, 35
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1395 (1997)).
73. Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al., supra note 64, at *17 (citing Steve W. Ander-
son et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 1032 (1999)); Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal
Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRIResults in Normal Subjects,
59 ARQ NEUROPSIQUIATR 657 (2001).
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anecdotal experience while simultaneously challenging a folk belief about
adolescent "superpredators."
Many state legislatures were exposed to the same developmental neu-
roscience presented in amicus briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper
and the Graham trilogy.7 4 While juvenile justice reform efforts existed be-
fore the advent of the new neuroscientific findings on adolescent brain de-
velopment, the neuroscience quickly became part of the legislative dia-
logue. 75 In his discussion of how "neuro-narratives" made by lobbyists in-
fluenced lawmaking, Francis Shen describes proposed legislation in New
York to raise the age of criminal responsibility from sixteen to eighteen
and to expand the jurisdiction of family court over juvenile delinquency
matters.76 Developmental neuroscience was explicitly referenced in the
bills. 77 Some states amended their laws to require consideration of "brain
development" in deciding whether a juvenile should be transferred from
juvenile to adult court. State regulatory and policy reforms to juvenile
justice practices have also referenced developmental neuroscience.7 ' The
prevalence of reform efforts and supporting discussion of developmental
neuroscience has been called "a new doctrine of youth, rooted in adoles-
cents' psychological and neuro-biological developmental status."80
Moreover, some state courts and legislatures appear to have been us-
ing developmental neuroscience to reconsider sentencing for a different
age cohort-youthful offenders, defined as adults under the age of twenty-
five. ' At least one state court has used empirical evidence of the change-
ability of young adults to extend its ban against life sentences to eighteen-
to twenty-five-year-old defendants.82 After discussing the developmental
neuropsychology justifying the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that chil-
dren are less culpable and more capable of change, the Illinois court re-
jected the bright-line distinction between an eighteen-year-old and a nine-
teen-year-old. The court quoted a Washington Post editorial, which
stated, "Research in neurobiology and developmental psychology has
74. Francis X. Shen, Legislating Neuroscience: The Case ofJuvenile Justice, 46 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 985, 996-1000 (2013).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1003-04.
78. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20(C)(5) (2019).
79. See, e.g., Shen, supra note 74, at 989, n. 12 (citing DANA SWAYZE & DANETTE BUSKOVICK,
MINN. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA JUVENILE DIVERSION: A SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE
PRACTICES AND PROGRAMMING 50 (2012) ("Adolescent brain development research shows that the
portions of the brain that govern reasoning and comprehending consequences are not fully developed
in youth. As such, diversion opportunities for youth are especially important given diminished reason-
ing capacity . . . ")).
80. Laura Cohen, Freedom's Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and
Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOzO L. REV. 1031, 1056-57 (2014).
81. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (2017)
(The Federal Sentencing Commission issued a report on federal youthful offender sentencing in re-
sponse to "[r]ecent studies on brain development and age" and Supreme Court cases that have spurred
policymakers to "reconsider how youthful offenders should be punished.").
82. See People v. House, 72 N.E.3d 357, 387 (111. App. Ct. 2017).
83. Id. at 385-86.
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shown that the brain doesn't finish developing until the mid-[twenties], far
later than was previously thought." 84 This accords with policy arguments"
and social science 8 6 on the eighteen- to twenty-five-year-old age cohort.
The Illinois court decision serves as another example of how science can
inform sentencing in ways that challenge older beliefs about human devel-
opment.
There remain significant differences between children and adults in
terms of culpability associated with retributive punishment and the effec-
tiveness of deterrence. These differences have been stressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Eighth Amendment context.8 7 As such, the Court's
decisions in Roper and the Graham trilogy are not wholly applicable to
adult sentencing. At the same time, the conceptual dichotomy between the
child capable of change and the irreparably corrupt88 child mirrors the di-
chotomy between adults who can be rehabilitated and those who are "ca-
reer criminals"89-a dichotomy that the next Part addresses.
II. FOLK BELIEFS AND THE SCIENCE OF ADULT CHANGE
A. The Idea ofPermanent Criminality in Adulthood
In this Section, I will discuss the folk beliefs and now-dated science
that supported the conclusion that adult change is the exception rather than
the norm. I then discuss how this belief manifests in sentencing policy
when people are designated as permanently criminal.
My claim that adults are perceived as unlikely to change requires
some clarification. As discussed in Part I, some adults who are convicted
of crimes are routed into rehabilitative programs. This practice, it would
seem, affirms a belief in the human capacity to change. I argue, however,
84. Id. at 387 (quoting Vincent Schiraldi & Bruce Western, Opinion, Why 21 Year-Old Offend-
ers Should Be Tried in Family Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/time-to-raise-the-juvenile-age-limit/2015/10/02/948e317c-6862- 11 e5-9ef3-
fdel 82507eac story.html.) Vincent Schiraldi is a Professor at the Columbia School of Social Work,
and Bruce Western is a Professor of Sociology at Harvard. Neither of the opinion editorial authors are
neuroscientists but have studied the implications of neuroscience for their areas of expertise. This is a
typical way in which courts assimilate scientific findings in their opinions. The citation in the opinion
is to a newspaper article summarizing an understanding of scientific findings, rather than to the peer-
reviewed scientific articles themselves.
85. For an example of a policy paper in the public sphere arguing for lawmakers to change
criminal justice responses for emerging adults, see, e.g., MAcARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L.
AND NEUROSCIENCE, How SHOULD JUSTICE POLICY TREAT YOUNG OFFENDERS? 3 (2017) ("Re-
searchers have found that in young adulthood, as in adolescence, areas of the brain that regulate func-
tions like judgment and self-control are still not fully mature").
86. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 641, 642-43 (2016).
87. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (discussing how Roper and Graham establish
that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing).
88. Id. at 479-80 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (discussing difficulty
determining which adolescent crime reflects "transient immaturity" and which crime reflects "irrepa-
rable corruption")).
89. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines define a "career offender" as anyone who has two prior
felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substances. UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.1(a) (2018).
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that the rehabilitative track is reserved for those who Gottschalk refers to
as the "non, non, nons"-"nonviolent, nonserious, and nonsexual offend-
ers."-who may benefit from reform efforts-and other criminal defend-
ants for whom the prospect of reform is dimmer.90 The "non, non, nons"
benefit from a threshold decision that they are not characterologically
criminal. Some ability to modify behavior is presumed for this group. The
problem lies with the other category-those deemed characterologically
criminal. While one could imagine a system in which only a select few of
the "worst of the worst" are deemed charaterologically criminal, the ten-
dency of U.S. punishment regimes is to assign permanent criminality to
most people convicted of a serious crime or of several crimes.9 1
Some scholars have argued that the practice of assuming inherent
criminality is a hallmark of the U.S. criminal justice system and distinct
from the English and European approach to crime.9 2 Although the lan-
guage varies, the tendency to designate individuals and groups as charac-
terologically criminal is certainly prevalent in U.S. discourse. Nicole Gon-
zalez Van Cleve, for example, documented how courtroom professionals
in Chicago's criminal courts describe defendants as belonging in one of
two categories: the "mopes" or the "monsters."9 3 While the "mopes" might
deserve a break, assistance, and special services, the "monsters" must be
incapacitated. Of course, at any point the line between "mopes" and "mon-
sters" can be moved to shrink the class of offenders entitled to second
chances.94
Whereas we may have grave misgivings about our ability to deter-
mine whether a child is permanently criminal, as expressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the juvenile death- and life-sentence cases, 95 we are
more confident in our ability to judge the criminality of adults. Indeed,
implicit in identifying the difficulty in distinguishing the permanently in-
corrigible juvenile is the assumption that it is possible to distinguish be-
tween permanent and temporary criminality in adults. Faith in our ability
to make such a distinction is evident in habitual offender statutes, life and
death sentences, and other forms of exclusion that target defendants based
on their crimes or criminal records.96 If this is correct, the demarcation
between the characterological criminal and the temporarily wayward
90. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 17, at 165-67.
9 1. Id.
92. Kleinfeld, supra note 18 ("Implicit in American punishment is the idea that serious or repeat
offenses mark the offenders as morally deformed people rather than ordinary people who have com-
mitted crimes").
93. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA'S
LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 69 (2016).
94. See Eaglin, supra note 16, at 210-13.
95. See supra Part I.
96. See supra Part I. Those judged characterologically criminal, of course, will rarely be the
beneficiaries of criminal legal reform.
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demonstrates a strong folk belief that adults do not change in ways con-
trary to their character, and that character can be known through observa-
ble actions. 97
A handful of studies demonstrate how people attempt to discern char-
acter when evaluating one another.98 In psychology, belief in a discerna-
ble, stable core of adult character is called "lay dispositionism." 99 People
who implicitly subscribe to lay dispositionism may: (a) believe that be-
havior reflects a person's true disposition; (b) believe that they can predict
a person's future behavior based on their knowledge of a person's dispo-
sition; and (c) expect that other people's behavior will be consistent in
different situations.' 00
The idea of stable character traits that shape a person's behavior in
predictable ways has philosophical antecedents as well. Virtue ethics, for
example, posits that each person has a set character that is ascertainable
through observing the person's behavior, and which will remain stable
over time."0 ' Thus, a person's character can be known through their ac-
tions, and their future actions can be predicted because their character will
not change.1 02
Character, writ large, is a capacious concept that extends beyond
what can be observed in behavior and personality. 10 3 Whether we have
fixed character apart from its transitory indicators-morals, motivations,
moods, thoughts, and actions-remains a subject of debate. 10 4 Addressing
the broader concept of character is beyond the scope of this Article. In-
stead, I focus on the folk concept of character as a shorthand for one's
intuitive sense of the type of person someone is. Rather than offering an
internal critique of character, I hold up this notion of character-as-type to
the observable phenomena of behavior and personality.'0o
97. JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 22-26
(2002) (referring to the belief that character is stable across time and context as "globalism").
98. See generally Geoffrey P. Goodwin et al., Moral Character Predominates in Person Per-
ception and Evaluation, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 148 (2013); Bogdan Wojciszke et al.,
On the Dominance of Moral Categories in Impression Formation, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1251 (1998).
99. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 92 (1991).
100. Chi-yue Chiu et al., Lay Dispositionism and Implicit Theories of Personality, 73 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 19 (1997) (citations omitted) (citing various studies).
101. DORIS, supra note 97, at 16-17.
102. Heraclitus is attributed with the quote, "Man's character is his fate." HERACLITUS,
FRAGMENTS 16 (John Burnet et al. trans. 1920).
103. In his article arguing that the instability of identity is relevant to criminal law, Mihailis E.
Diamantis discusses character within the context of identity formation and change. Mihailis E. Dia-
mantis, Limiting Identity in Criminal Law, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8-9)
(available online at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3355575).
104. See, e.g., DORIS, supra note 97, at 5-6.
105. See discussion infra pp. 184-86.
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Behavior is arguably more malleable than personality.1 0 6 Yet our ten-
dency is to assume that adult behavior will remain constant over time.
"You can't teach an old dog new tricks," as the saying goes. Take, for
example, addictive behaviors, which are characterized by a physiological
dependence that motivates the addicted person to repeatedly seek out the
substance."o' Lay intuitions assume that adults will have more difficulty
recovering from addiction as they age.10 In one study, participants were
asked to predict the success of drug treatment for addicts of different
ages. 10 9 Study participants predicted that older adults would be less likely
to recover from drug addiction than their younger counterparts.o10 The re-
searchers concluded that participants held implicit beliefs that younger,
but not older, adults were capable of change, and this belief shaped
whether the study participants supported programs designed to assist older
adults.' The study supports the view that we predict people will be less
capable of change as they get older, when, in fact, people of varying ages
develop and recover from addictions. 1 12
Lay dispositionalism does not exist in a vacuum.1 3 It was endorsed
by early psychologists and neurologists. In 1890, psychologist William
James wrote that personality is "set like plaster" by age thirty and will
"never soften again."'4 This claim was the jumping-off point for a century
of research aimed at identifying personality traits that remain constant
throughout life." 5 The stable constants of personality, defined broadly as
"the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical
106. Again, some defendants may be seen as being able to control their behavior regardless of
their proclivities. This is part of the central argument for specific deterrence as a sentencing goal. The
threat of punishment presumes the ability to control behavior, regardless of one's proclivities, person-
ality, or desire. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 141-42 (Batoche Books 2000) (1781). Rehabilitation also presumes the ability to
change, but, as I suggest throughout this Article, rehabilitation is reserved for select groups of people
convicted of crimes who are not perceived as characterologically criminal. The modem penitentiary
was premised on the idea of spontaneous moral reform or rehabilitation through occupational therapy.
Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L. REv. 383, 400-01 (2015).
107. Because the definition of addiction is contested, it is often described by its constituent be-
haviors. See Steve Sussman & Alan N. Sussman, Considering the Definition ofAddiction, 8 INT'L J.
ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 4025, 4025-30 (2011) (distilling five elements of addiction from meta-
analysis of fifty-two studies).
108. Rebecca Neel & Bethany Lassetter, Growing Fixed With Age: Lay Theories of Malleability
Are Target Age-Specific, 41 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1505, 1517 (2015).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1519.
112. Birgit Koechl et al., Age-Related Aspects ofAddiction, 58 GERONTOLOGY 540, 540 (2012)
("substance use, abuse and addiction are not limited to a specific age group"); see Rumi Kato Price et
al., Remission From Drug Abuse Over a 25-Year Period: Patterns ofRemission and Treatment Use,
91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1107, 1111 (2001) (longitudinal study of drug users describing patterns of
remission from age twenty through middle-age).
113. Lay belief in the fixed nature of dispositions, "lay dispositionism," encompasses perspec-
tives on personality. Jason E. Plaks et al., Lay Theories of Personality: Cornerstones of Meaning in
Social Cognition, 3 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1069, 1070 (2009).
114. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 121 (1890).
115. DORIS, supra note 97, at 18-19 (explaining that, "[lhike virtues, personality traits are sup-
posed to be robust").
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systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought," became
the subject of decades of research.16
Part of the attraction of the idea of stable personalities is the hope that
we could reliably predict behavior. People should act in accordance with
their personality. This "globalism" would mean that a trait has a high prob-
ability of consistently emerging in circumstances similar to those in which
the trait first emerged.'17 In other words, those espousing the view of stable
personality traits believe that people will act the same in similar situations
throughout their lives.' 18 If the hypothesis is proven, it supports a concep-
tualization of "personality as more or less coherent and integrated with
reliable, relatively situation-resistant, behavioral implications."" So, for
example, we could predict that a person who possesses the personality trait
of introversion will avoid large crowds, and that this behavior will remain
consistent over time because introversion is a fixed trait.
Nowhere was the claim that adults do not change more absolute than
in the field of neurology before the advent of neuroimaging technology.
Previously, neurologists contended that the brain was described as fully
developed after the second decade of life and, thereafter, changed only
through deterioration. As one author put it:
For four hundred years [the idea of changing an adult brain's function-
ing] would have been inconceivable because mainstream medicine and
science believed that brain anatomy was fixed. The common wisdom
was that after childhood the brain changed only when it began the long
process of decline; that when brain cells failed to develop properly, or
were injured, or died, they could not be replaced.1 20
Twentieth century neurologists searched for anatomical signs of neu-
ral growth and regeneration but lacked the instruments to observe brain
structure and activity over time.121 This led the great neuroanatomist, San-
tiago Ramon y Cajal, to conclude that, in the adult brain, "[e]verything
may die, nothing may be regenerated. It is for the science of the future to
change, if possible, this harsh decree." 22 As I discuss later, this "harsh
116. GORDON.W. ALLPORT, PATTERN AND GROWTH IN PERSONALITY 28 (1961); Cloninger et
al., A Psychobiological Model of Temperament and Character, 50 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
975, 975-76 (1993). It is beyond the scope to parse personality and character, which are defined very
differently depending on the area of study. Here, I use character when the researchers use the term. It
is measured using models like the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI), which categorizes
personality into three primary dimensions: "novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward depend-
ence." Personality as a predictor of behavior, and four character dimensions: "persistence, self-direct-
edness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence." Both personality and character traits influence be-
havior.
117. DORIS, supra note 97, at 22-23.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 22-23.
120. NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF, at xiii (2007).
121. Id. at 249.
122. SANTIAGO RAMON Y CAJAL, DEGENERATION AND REGENERATION OF THE NERVOUS
SYSTEM 750 (Javier DeFelipe & Edward G. Jones eds., Raoul M. May, trans. 1991).
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decree" has been debunked through technological advances in neurosci-
ence.'23 Moreover, longitudinal studies of personality found many person-
ality traits to be much less stable than the earlier generation of researchers
predicted. 124 Not yet responsive to these changes in scientific thought,
criminal law's idea of adult permanence has had far-reaching sentencing
consequences.
As I mention above, folk beliefs about permanence of character,
which we can see were supported by older scientific claims about fixed
personalities in adulthood, are an integral aspect of sentencing. It is the
underlying assumption for deciding that someone's crime reflects a char-
acter of "irreparable corruption." 125 The word "irreparable," taken from
the Court's decision in Roper, allows no hope of rehabilitation.1 26 The be-
lief that someone has a bad or criminal character correlates with punitive-
ness. 12 7 The idea that people do not change resulted in "bad-person attrib-
utions," which, in turn, correlated with the desire to seek violent revenge
against the "bad person."1 28 Whether we believe people can change di-
rectly impacts our punitive response to their harmful actions.
Because a defendant who is deemed to have made a criminal misstep
that is considered out of character may be given a chance to rehabilitate,
the task of the sentencing judge is to sort the hardened criminal from the
temporarily wayward. To the temporarily wayward, the sentencing regime
offers a path forward for rehabilitation. For the hardened criminal, the sen-
tencing regime offers permanent exclusion. In both cases, something in-
trinsic and permanent to the defendant-criminality or lack-of-inherent-
criminality-is the subject of attempted discernment.
Even if we accept the premise that some people may be charactero-
logically criminal, identifying them is a difficult task. It is unclear whether
anyone can be reliably categorized as permanently criminal. Criminology
has made every effort to develop criteria for discerning the difference be-
tween defendants whose criminal behavior will persist and those whose
criminal behavior will desist. 12 9
Some criminologists, for example, have looked for typologies of tem-
perament that could explain persistence in antisocial or criminal behavior
123. See discussion infra pages 172-76.
124. See discussion infra pages 176-78.
125. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68 (2010) & Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
126. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
127. Chiu et al., supra note 100, at 934; Benjamin M. Gervey et al., Differential Use ofPerson
Information in Decisions About Guilt Versus Innocence: The Role of Implicit Theories, 25
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 17, 26 (1999) (discussing entity theorist belief in fixed moral
character prompting question, "what type of person is this?" and making judgments of guilt accord-
ingly).
128. David S. Yeager et al., Adolescents' Implicit Theories Predict Desire for Vengeance After
Peer Conflicts: Correlational and Experimental Evidence, 47 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1090, 1103 (2011).
129. See, e.g., Rolf Locher et al., Developmental Pathways in Disruptive Child Behavior, 5 DEV.
& PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 103, 129 (1993).
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throughout life.i1o This typology of offenders relies on static correlates to
predict lifetime offending.131 These correlates could be events that oc-
curred during childhood, traits of the individual perceived constant
throughout life, or biological traits. For example, Temie Moffitt offered
the theory of two types of people who commit crimes: those who persist
throughout life and are, thus, "life-course persistent" (LCP), and those who
mature out of crime and are thus "adolescent-limited" (AL).1 32 She then
aimed to understand which variables in early life put a person at risk of
being LCP.1 3 3 The variables considered are static in that they relate to ear-
lier events in the offender's life that cannot be changed. The variables may
correlate positively to offending rates or correlate negatively as "protec-
tive factors" that are associated with desisting from crime.13
Developmental criminology has had little success predicting long-
term reoffending based on static factors (like childhood development). So-
cial scientists have attempted to identify variables that correlate with per-
sistent criminality, but the variables do not account for future events that
may change the person's course, nor do they reliably predict future con-
duct. The discipline confesses that "long-term predictions are flawed and
imperfect, and early risk factors do not always predict long-term criminal
career outcomes." 35
Clinical judgment of individual defendants fairs no better. Experts
called to testify about the future dangerousness of the defendant during the
sentencing phase of death penalty trials cannot predict with accuracy and,
instead, are limited to describing variables that correlate, on average, with
130. See Matt DeLisi & Michael G. Vaughn, Foundation for a Temperament-Based Theory of
Antisocial Behavior and Criminal Justice System Involvement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (2014) (pro-
posing a theoretical model of temperament along two interacting axes, "effortful control" and "nega-
tive emotionality"). DeLisi and Vaughn define temperament as "the stable, largely innate tendency
with which an individual experiences the environment and regulates his or her responses to the envi-
ronment." Id.
131. Id.
132. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 679 (1993) [hereinafter Moffitt, Taxonomy].
Moffitt added more proposed types, or subtypes in later research. Terrie E. Moffitt, Life-Course-Per-
sistent Versus Adolescent-Limited Antisocial Behavior, in 3 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 570, 593
(Dante Cicchetti & Donald J. Cohen eds., 2006).
133. See Moffitt, Taxonomy, supra note 132, at 679.
134. See Julien Morizot & Lila Kazemian, Introduction: Understanding Criminal andAntisocial
Behavior Within a Developmental and Multidisciplinary Perspective, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 7 (Julien Morizot & Lila Kazemian, eds., 2015). The de-
velopmental criminology approach should be distinguished from the sociological approach of the
"life-course paradigm," which focuses on "turning points" in life trajectories rather than early risk
factors. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 8 (citing JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT
LIVES: DELIQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70 194 (2003)); Lila Kazemian et al., Can We Make Accurate
Long-Term Predictions About Patterns of De-escalation in Offending Behavior?, 38 J. YOUTH
ADOLESCENCE 384, 397 (2009)).
2019] 169
DENVER LAW REVIEW
recidivism.' 3 6 Even the medical diagnosis of antisocial personality disor-
der is not coextensive with criminal conduct.1 3 7
Actuarial methods that use risk assessment instruments have also had
little success in predicting reoffense, particularly beyond a five-year pe-
riod.13 8 As John Pfaff puts it, our sentencing practices "incapacitate people
longer than necessary and provide little deterrence in exchange." 39 More-
over, neither clinical nor actuarial methods of prediction adequately ac-
count for future events that may change the defendant in unexpected
ways.1 40 While more recent research attempts to take into account dynamic
variables that affect reoffense throughout the lifespan, these dynamic var-
iables are often unpredictable life events like getting married or having a
child. 14 1 The many variables that shape the course of lives make it exceed-
ingly difficult to reliably predict how people are likely to behave over the
course of their lives.
The belief that people do not change also promotes a jaundiced view
of rehabilitation programs. In 1973, an influential study of ex-offenders
noted high recidivism rates regardless of participation in various kinds of
prison programming and probationary interventions. 142 Concluding that
none of the interventions resulted in statistically meaningful reductions in
recidivism, the study concluded that "nothing works." 4 3 The study, of
course, could not conclude that nothing works, only that the experience of
prison, parole, and probation, as then practiced, did not rehabilitate the
offenders included in the study. 144 Nevertheless, the phrase, "nothing
works," became a buzzword and rallying cry to defund rehabilitation pro-
grams. If "nothing works" to rehabilitate because people do not change,
the goal of incarceration is incapacitation for as long as possible to protect
public safety.1 4 5 Within a few decades, the "nothing works" philosophy
supplanted the rehabilitative model that guided early twentieth century
136. John F. Edens et al., Predictions ofFuture Dangerousnes in Capital Murder Trials: Is it the
Time to "Disinventh the Wheel? ", 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 56 (2005).
137. See Richard Howard, Personality Disorders and Violence: What Is The Link?, 2
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER & EMOTION DYSREGULATION, 2015, at 1, 1.
138. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 10, at 466.
139. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION-AND How TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 187 (2017).
1 40. See Nadin Beckmann & Robert E. Wood, Editorial: Dynamic Personality Science. Inte-
grating Between-Person Stability and Within-Person Change, 8 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Sept. 8,
2017, at 1,4-5; discussion infra pp. 178-81.
141. Morizot & Kazemian, supra note 134, at 1-2.
142. Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions andAnswers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT.,
Spring 1974, at 1, 22, 25, 48 (emphasis omitted). Flanders discusses whether and how much this was
influential, but only in passing.
143. Id. at 48-49.
144. Id. at 49.
145. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 57, at 282, 293 (describing California's current sentencing re-
gime as one of "'total' incapacitation" where incarceration is seen as "appropriate whenever an of-
fender poses any degree of risk to the community").
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criminal justice practices like ensuring the availability of parole release
and instituting educational programs in prisons.'46
To summarize the argument thus far, adjustments to folk beliefs
about a criminal class of "superpredator" children, who were destined to
live lives of crime, have led to modest but notable changes in thinking
about sentencing children who commit serious crimes. The argument that
children are not yet formed and capable of great changes through matura-
tion, however, is usually contrasted with the fixed nature of adults. An
adult who commits a serious crime, or who has a lengthy criminal record,
demonstrates who they are. If this fixed nature is accurate, the sentencing
task is to identify the characterological criminals and permanently inca-
pacitate them.
Above, I laid out the folk theories and dated science underlying the
idea of permanent criminality. In the next Section, I discuss studies that
challenge the project of identifying the characterological criminal in a
more fundamental way. The studies challenge the idea of permanence in
personality and behavior.
B. Change in Adulthood
Research in multiple fields demonstrates that change in adulthood is
the norm rather than the exception, and that these changes occur not just
in response to the aging process but in response to environmental stimuli
at any point in life. I argue that the idea of adult change, especially neuro-
plasticity as physical proof of adult change, has seeped into folk belief in
some areas of discourse but not into the folk psychology of crime.
The past two decades have seen a major shift in scientific thinking
about adult capacity to change. Neurospsychological testing has improved
dramatically in the twentieth century, allowing researchers to finely dif-
ferentiate and measure aspects of cognitive abilities using reliable clinical
testing. Current research uses techniques such as neuroimagining in com-
bination with controlled-study experimentation. 147 The link between be-
havior and "the functioning of brain systems" is thus more clearly estab-
lished than in the past. 14 8 Below, I offer a sampling of studies from neuro-
science, personality psychology, social-context studies, and criminology
to demonstrate the broad range of research on the science of adult change.
146. For a clear articulation of the rehabilitative purposes of criminal sentencing, see, e.g., Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949); see also Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal
Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 230 (1959).
147. See, e.g., Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin & Brian Knutson, Reward Processing and Risky De-
cision Making in the Aging Brain, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF RISKY DECISION MAKING (Valerie F.
Reyna & Vivian Zayas eds., 2014).
148. See Ruben C. Gur et al., A Perspective on the Potential Role ofNeuroscience in the Court,
85 FORDHAM L. REv. 547, 553 (2016).
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1. Neuroscience
Current research suggests that the brain is characterized by neuro-
plasticity, a phenomenon that can be observed in imaging studies in com-
bination with clinical observations.14 9 "Neuroplasticity [is] defined as the
ability of the nervous system to respond to intrinsic or extrinsic stimuli by
reorganizing its structure, function and connections."150 Studies demon-
strate that environmental stimuli encourages neurogenesis and new neural
connections.15 1 As adults learn new skills, areas of their brains required to
complete the skills demonstrate structural changes. 5 2 Equally impres-
sively, when areas of the brain associated with certain functions are dam-
aged,15 3 other areas of the brain not associated with the function will often
restructure themselves and assume the lost function. 15 4 This discovery sig-
nificantly qualified the previous orthodoxy that different areas of the brain
have highly specialized and discrete functions that, once damaged, cannot
be recovered. 5 5
Neuroscientists have identified specific kinds of neuroplasticity,
some of which do not involve the production of new neurons. For example,
the brain evinces plasticity by reorganizing without gaining new neurons,
149. Steven C. Cramer et al., Harnessing Neuroplasticity for Clinical Applications, 134 BRAIN
1591, 1592 (2011).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., DOIDGE, supra note 120, at 43.
152. See, e.g., Bogdan Draganski et al., Changes in Grey Matter Induced by Training, 427
NATURE 311, 311 (2004).
153. That the brain has discrete areas that accomplish certain tasks was first discovered in 1861
by Pierre Paul Broca. In an autopsy, he discovered that a patient's language deficits correlated with
damage to a discrete area of the patient's brain. Gur et al., supra note 148, at 550. Discoveries of links
between specific areas of the brain and demonstrable behaviors continued. Almost a century after
Broca's discovery, Roger Penfield mapped the motor system of his patients by observing how stimu-
lating discrete areas of their contralateral hemispheres resulted in involuntary movement in different
parts of their bodies and stimulating areas of their parietal lobes resulted in sensations in discrete parts
of their bodies. Id. at 551-52. In the words of Nobel Prize winning neuroscientist, Eric Kandel, "When
I was a medical student in the 1950's, we were taught that the map of [Penfield's] somatosensory
cortex ... [was] fixed and immutable throughout life." ERIC R. KANDEL, IN SEARCH OF MEMORY:
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SCIENCE OF MIND 216 (2006).
154. For an account of this discovery, see DOIDGE, supra note 120, at 53-65 (describing an early
discovery of brain "remapping" by Michael Merzenich). Of course, neuroimaging also demonstrates
when the brain in damaged beyond repair. In many cases, however, it remains difficult to predict
outcomes. See, e.g., Jinxi Gao & Zhaocong Zheng, Development of Prognostic Models for Patients
with Traumatic Brain Injury: A Systematic Review, 8 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL MED.
19881, 19882-83 (2015) (discussing most commonly used prognosis calculators for predicting out-
comes of traumatic brain injury).
155. For an early example of a researcher challenging the theory of discrete brain functions, see
Paul Bach-y-Rita, Sensory Plasticity: Applications to a Vision Substitution System, 43 ACTA
NEUROLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 417, 417 (1967). For early studies conducted on rats that revealed an
increased size and branching of neurons, see Marian C. Diamond et al., Extensive Cortical Depth
Measurements and Neuron Size Increases in the Cortex of Environmentally Enriched Rats, 131 J.
COMP. NEUROLOGY 357, 357 (1967); W.T. Greenough & F.R. Volkmar, Pattern ofDendritic Branch-
ing in Occipital Cortex of Rats Reared in Complex Environments, 40 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY
491, 492-93 (1973).
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allowing new areas of the brain to engage in functions that were the prov-
ince of other areas of the brain before the reorganization.1 56 Neurons be-
come bigger, or synaptic connections become more prolific and stronger,
through practice. 157 Brain functions can become synchronized or desyn-
chronized as the activity of one neuron affects the activity of another-a
phenomenon popularized by Carla Shatz' phrase "[neurons] that fire to-
gether wire together." 58
The "rewiring" of the brain occurs in response to experience and can
be "stable and long-lasting" if accompanied by anatomical changes.' 5 9 In
other instances, the rewiring may be the result of a temporary change in
the "strength of [the] synaptic connections between neurons," and not last
long past the triggering experience. 160 So, for example, neuroscientists can
observe, using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), anatomical changes in
the brain that occur when a person learns a new skill, such as juggling, and
can measure the degree to which the changes endure or fade over time. 6 1
Melissa Lau and Hollis Cline recount one of the most remarkable studies
of brain change in response to training, that of the London taxi drivers.' 6 2
To be a taxi driver in London, the applicant must pass a test that demon-
strates their thorough knowledge of more than twenty thousand streets and
twenty thousand city landmarks.'63 Neuroimaging of applicants and taxi
driver brains show neuroanatomical changes in response to learning. Once
working as taxi drivers, they "have larger posterior hippocampi-a region
involved in spatial memory" than the general public.1 6 4
More surprisingly, neuroscience has confirmed that adult brains can
undergo neurogenesis, meaning the formation of new neurons.' 65 Neuronal
stem cells that have the capacity to reproduce themselves and become neu-
156. See, e.g., Mellanie V. Springer et al., The Relation Between Brain Activity During Memory
Tasks and Years ofEducation in Young and Older Adults, 19 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 181, 181 (2005).
157. See Melissa Lau & Hollis Cline, How You Use Your Brain Can Change Its Basic Structural
Organization, in THINK TANK 52, 56-57 (David J. Linden ed., 2018).
158. Carla J. Shatz, The Developing Brain, 267 SC. AM. 60, 62 (1992). A word of caution is
required here. The phrase alters the initial neuroscientific hypothesis, advanced by Donald Hebb, that
a neuron firing can trigger the firing of a near-by neuron. Christian Keysers & Valeria Gazzola,
Hebbian Learning and Predictive Mirror Neurons for Actions, Sensations and Emotions, 369 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL Soc'y., 2014, at 1, 1-2. The hypothesis has been used clinically to create or
decouple mental associations that produce certain impulses or behavior. See DOIDGE, supra note 120,
at 174 (discussing how "[n]eurons that fire apart wire apart").
159. Alison L. Barth, Tool Use Can Instantly Rewire the Brain, in THINK TANK, supra note 157,
at 60, 62.
160. Id.
161. Draganski et al., supra note 152, at 311.
162. Lau & Cline, supra note 157.
163. Id. at 52.
164. Id. at 52 n. 1 (citing numerous studies, the most recent of which is K. Woolett & E.A. Mac-
guire, Acquiring "the Knowledge" ofLondon 's Layout Drives Structural Brain Change, 21 CURRENT
BIOLOGY 2109, 2109 (2011)).
165. See DOIDGE, supra note 120, at 251-53; Henriette van Praag et al., Running Increases Cell
Proliferation and Neurogenesis in the Adult Mouse Dentate Gyrus, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 266,
267 (1999); Gerd Kempermann et al., More Hippocampal Neurons in Adult Mice Living in an En-
riched Environment, 386 NATURE 493, 493 (1997).
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rons were first discovered in 1998 in a region of the brain called the hip-
pocampus.' 6 6 The discovery has led to over two decades of research into
the relationship between neurogenesis (new neural growth) and learn-
ing.1 6 7 Early studies on mice and rats demonstrated that their brains could
produce tens of thousands of new neurons in response to environmental
stimulants like running wheels and tunnels.16 8 A more recent, growing
body of research explores neurological change in humans in response to
experience.169 Experience of all kinds has the capacity to change the brain.
Research has demonstrated that participating in "psychotherapy can result
in detectable changes in the brain." 7 0 And researchers and clinicians are
experimenting with experiential interventions as a supplement or alterna-
tive to traditional treatments for cognitive disorders.1 7 1
Critically, the social and emotional circuitry of the brain changes in
response to new environments and experiences. 172 Compassion training,
for example, results in visible changes "in brain regions that are involved
,,173[in] social cognition and empathetic responses. These neurological
changes in response to compassion training correlate with reduced aggres-
sive behavior.1 7 4 Likewise, "mindfulness [training] increases grey matter
concentration in brain regions" associated with emotional regulation, em-
pathy, and self-awareness.s7 5 These areas of neuroplasticity are relevant to
sentencing because they demonstrate the potential for significant personal
change in response to environment, presumably even among adults who
have committed violent crimes.
A caveat is in order. Change is not always easy, and it may be partic-
ularly difficult when the person seeking to change is not exposed to envi-
ronmental stimuli that encourage change. One of the reasons that brain
change is difficult is that neural networks are self-reinforcing and self-sus-
taining.1 7 6 This creates a physical structure for habit.' 77 "Atop this mass
166. Peter S. Eriksson et al., Neurogenesis in the Adult Human Hippocampus, 4 NATURE MED.
1313, 1313, 1315 (1998); Hong-jun Song et al., Neural Stem Cellsfrom Adult Hippocampus Develop
Essential Properties ofFunctional CNS Neurons, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 438 (2002).
167. See DOIDGE, supra note 120, at 250-51.
168. See Id. at 251-53; van Praag et al., supra note 165, at 269; Kempermann et al., supra note
165, at 493, 495.
169. See Michael M. Merzenich et al., Brain Plasticity-Based Therapeutics, 8 FRONTIERS HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE, no. 385, 2014, at 1, 1-2 (noting that "studies have now provided us with a first-level
understanding of the rules of the processes that govern brain change, both as they account for a pro-
gression of the brain in a degrading, 'aging,' or distorting-or a strengthening, 'rejuvenating,' or cor-
rective neurological direction.").
170. Amit Etkin et al., Toward a Neurobiology of Psychotherapy: Basic Science and Clinical
Applications, 17 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 145, 155 (2005).
171. See Mor Nahum et al., Principles of Neuroplasticity-Based Rehabilitation, in 207
PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 141, 156-57 (Michael M. Merzenich et al eds., 2013).
172. Federica Coppola, Valuing Emotions in Punishment: An Argumentfor Social Rehabilitation
with the Aid of Social and Affective Neuroscience, NEUROETHICS, Dec. 4, 2018, at 1, 1.
173. Id.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. Adrian M. Haith, Almost Everything You Do is a Habit, in THINK TANK, supra note 157, at
177, 181.
177. Id.
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conglomeration of habits sits a thin sliver of cognitive deliberation that
steers only the highest-level decisions that we ever need to make. And
without habits, it would be quickly overwhelmed."1 78 As neuroscientist
Richard Davidson stresses, we do not know the limits of what can and
cannot change in the human brain, and this state of unknowing demands
our humility.
Critics of neuroscience's influence on criminal law are right to cau-
tion against overconfidence and overclaiming. 17 9 We still know very little
about how the brain works, and today's scientific findings may be rebutted
by tomorrow's research. But, even legal scholars who caution that criminal
law should not jettison its ideas about criminal culpability based on a nas-
cent field of neuroscience agree that "[b]rain maturation continues into the
mid-twenties and the brain is plastic and always changing."o The finding
of general neuroplasticity serves to decrease our confidence in predicting
human behavior over time.
2. Personality Psychology
Cognitive and social science studies accord with the finding of neu-
roplasticity by demonstrating that personality traits, once thought to be
immutable in adulthood, change throughout life. While traditional wisdom
held that adolescent personality shifts into fixed personality in adulthood,
studies demonstrate that personality traits continue to change throughout
the lifespan. 81 To be sure, childhood and adolescence are a time of dra-
matic changes in the "Big Five" personality traits-extroversion, agreea-
bleness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience.' 8 2
Studies show, however, that agreeableness and conscientiousness tend to
increase in middle age; while extroversion and neuroticism tend to de-
crease. 8 3
The results of these studies of personality trait change in adults are
ground-breaking. As one researcher stated, the fact that "most mean-level
personality-trait change occurs between ages [twenty] and [forty] . . . con-
tradicts the widely held perspective that the most interesting years for stud-
ying personality development are either early or late in life" and "opens a
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509, 509-15 (2013).
180. Id. at 520-21 (citing Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Pschiat-
ric Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 24-27, Graham v. Florida, 558 U.S. 811 (2009) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621),
2009 WL 2236778); C. Antoinette Clarke, Bridging the Gap: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Juve-
nile Justice Policy, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 927, 934 (2007)).
181. Brent W. Roberts et al., Patterns of Mean-Level Change in Personality Traits Across the
Life Course: A Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Studies, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL., No. 1, 2006, at 1, 13
(meta-analysis of ninety-two studies demonstrating a mean-level change in 75% of personality traits
in middle age).
182. Christopher J. Soto et al., Age Differences in Personality Traits from 10 to 65: Big Five
Domains and Facets in a Large Cross-Sectional Sample, 100 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 330,
340-41 (2011).
183. Sanjay Srivastava et al., Development of Personality in Early and Middle Adulthood: Set
Like Plaster or Persistent Change?, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1041, 1045-47 (2003).
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new area of focus in developmental science."' 84 Further, the studies
demonstrate that humans remain an "open system" throughout life, sus-
ceptible to change at the fundamental level of personality.' 85
Particularly relevant to this discussion is that the personality change
in adulthood trends in a prosocial direction and that most people become
"more confident, warm, responsible, and calm."' 8 6 Other psychological
studies have found an age-related "positivity effect," whereby adults in-
crease their optimism, possibly in response to realization of their increas-
ingly limited lifespan.1 8 7 These changes in personality and outlook seem
likely to account for at least some of the reduced participation in criminal
activity in the second half of life.
To be sure, some of the psychological and cognitive studies on adult
development have contradictory results. This is particularly true of studies
involving "older adults"-a term of variable meaning in the literature but
typically including people age sixty-five and older. The studies attempt to
define which areas of functioning deteriorate, improve, or remain con-
stant.188 The results are mixed. Some clinical studies show that emotional
regulation "may be more automatic" and require less effort with age.' 8 9
Traits that influence emotional regulation, like the ability to ignore nega-
tive stimuli and focus on positive stimuli, have been shown to increase
with age.' 90 Other studies, however, do not demonstrate heightened emo-
tional regulation among older adults, at least not in the laboratory set-
ting.'9 ' Even data derived from neuroimaging and autopsies varies regard-
ing whether the brain changes in ways that will effect emotional function-
ing.1 92
Results of studies on the ability to empathize with others are also
mixed and appear to depend on study variables such as the age of the co-
hort of older adults.' 9 3 A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
184. Brent W. Roberts & Daniel Mroczek, Personality Trail Change in Adulthood, 17 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Scr. 31, 33 (2008).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Laura L. Carstensen et al., Emotional Experience Improves with Age: Evidence Based on
over 10 Years ofExperience Sampling, 26 PSYCHOL. & AGING 21, 22, 29 (2011); Laura L. Carstensen
et al., The Influence ofa Sense of Time on Human Development, 312 SCl. 1913, 1913, 1915 (2006);
Laura L. Carstensen & Joseph A. Mikels, At the Intersection of Emotion and Cognition: Aging and
the Positivity Effect, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 117, 118-19 (2005).
188. Mara Mather, The Affective Neuroscience of Aging, 67 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 213, 213
(2016).
189. Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin & Laura L. Carstensen, Socioemotional Functioning and the
Aging Brain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 507, 515-16 (Jean Decety &
John T. Cacioppo eds., 2011) (describing how changes in striatal, insular, and prefrontal function in
adult brains may cause affective processing to remain intact in older adults).
190. Mara Mather & Laura L. Carstensen, Aging and Motivated Cognition: The Positivity Effect
in Attention and Memory, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCi. 496, 496 (2005).
191. For a discussion of the literature, see Mather, supra note 188, at 222 (discussing theories of
emotional regulation that suggest the ability to regulate emotions differs when applied in a controlled
laboratory environment).
192. Id at 215.
193. Id. at 224-25.
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study, reported in the Boston Globe in 2015, measured cognitive skills in
over 50,000 adult study participants, and found, among many findings,
that the ability to identify the emotional state of another person by looking
at their eyes is highest from age forty to sixty.1 94 The significance of this
finding to sentencing could be thought of in terms of a thirty-five-year-old
defendant whose crime appears to reflect his lack of empathy. Although
well into adulthood, we can predict that he is statistically likely to become
more empathetic as he enters his next decade of life. These developmental
changes that occur in middle age cast doubt on the current sentencing
framework, which draws a bright line between the capacity of children and
the capacity of adults to change.
I have highlighted the limits of the research on the psychology of
personality traits in order not to overstate the claim of adult capacity to
change. The truth probably lies, as it usually does, somewhere in the mid-
dle. "There is both stability and variability in personality."'95 Aware that
personality traits are mutable, researchers have moved on to studying
which aspects of personality are most likely to fluctuate with context and
relationships.' 9 6 The result of this focus is a growing body of research that
demonstrates long-term personality changes in response to "life circum-
stances."' 9 7
Many in the fields of personality psychology-both trait theorists and
social-cognitive theorists---concede that there is both stability and varia-
bility in personality, and researchers note that both long- and short-term
variability are important areas of study. 8 They describe personality as
somewhat stable, but with this qualification:
Whilst individuals differ from each other in predictable ways-differ-
ences that can sufficiently be described by broad trait constructs such
as neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, extraver-
sion, and core self evaluations-they also vary systematically in the
194. Kay Lazar, Older and Wiser? Some Brain Functions Improve as We Age, BOSTON GLOBE
(Mar. 5, 2015, 10:39 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/03/05/maybe-aging-isn-bad-af-
ter-all/VG7Jr73FstxcTI2h29CgRL/story.html. The reported study is, Joshua K. Hartshorne & Laura
T. Germine, When Does Cognitive Functioning Peak? The Asynchronous Rise and Fall of Different
Cognitive Abilities Across the Lifespan, 26 PSYCHOL. SC. 433, 433 (2015) (finding "considerable
heterogeneity" in cognitive functioning across the lifespan, with some cognitive skills peaking after
age forty); cf Mather, supra note 188, at 222-23 (suggesting that older adults' ability to recognize
emotions, like fear and sadness, from the facial expressions of others declines with age).
195. Beckmann & Wood, supra note 140, at 2.
196. See, e.g., John F. Rauthmann et al., Principles of Situation Research: Towards a Better
Understanding of Psychological Situations, 29 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 363, 364 (2015) (discussing
studies that analyze the effect that differing situations have on personality and outlines the nomencla-
ture used in the studies).
197. Beckmann & Wood, supra note 140, at 5 (citing Esther Niehoffet al., International Sojourn
Experience and Personality Development. Selection and Socialization Effects of Studying Abroad and
the Big Five, 112 PERSONALITY INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 55, 55-56 (2017)); Wiebke Bleidorn et al.,
Life Events and Personality Trait Change, 86 J. PERSONALITY 83, 83-84 (2016); Oliver Luidtke et al.,
A Random Walk Down University Avenue: Life Paths, Life Events, and Personality Trait Change at
the Transition to University Life, 101 J.PERSONALITY & SOC.PSYCHOL. 620, 621 (2011).
198. Beckmann & Wood, supra note 140, at 2.
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ways they respond to situations they encounter and change as a person
over time."1 99
This "integrated approach to personality" 2 0 0 is currently the subject
of diverse empirical studies. Rather than viewing personality traits as
fixed, leading to predictable behaviors, the new studies catalogue contin-
gent personality traits, which are sensitive to how people change in re-
sponse to context.2 0 1
It is likely that other variables relevant to criminal sentencing will be
explored in future studies of adult development, such as the relationship
between addiction recovery and age. We currently lack extensive literature
on addiction recovery trends throughout the human lifespan, but a survey
of the existing literature suggests that adults have more "recovery capital,"
meaning "the amount and quality of resources that one can bring to bear
to initiate and sustain recovery from addiction." 20 2 Moreover, almost sev-
enty percent of adults recover without treatment, probably in response to
the accretion of negative consequences of addiction over the years.203
More research is needed, however, before anything can be said with con-
fidence about the relationship between age and prospects of long-term re-
covery from substance abuse.2 04
3. The Contextual Nature of Behavior
Related to the idea that people change over time is the idea that be-
havior is a product of external as well as internal factors. Situationist re-
search aims to understand how much human behavior results from envi-
ronmental prompts rather than internal prompts, like character.2 05 Some
early situationist experiments made quite a splash.206 The Stanford Prison
Experiment, for example, demonstrated that average college students
quickly became violent, abusive, and corrupt when involved in an immer-
sive role-play experiment in which they played the role of prison guards
199. Id at 1 (emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 5 (citing Jason L. Huang & Ann Marie Ryan, Beyond Personality Traits: A Study of
Personality States and Situational Contingencies in Customer Service Jobs, 64 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL.
451,481 (2011)).
202. William L. White, Recovery Across the Life Cycle from Alchohol/Other Drug Problems, 24
ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 185, 190 (2006) (the recovery advantage wanes in "older" adults, but
the author does not specify what age he considers "older.") (citing ROBERT GRANFIELD & WILLIAM
CLOUD, COMING CLEAN: OVERCOMING ADDICTION WITHOUT TREATMENT 179 (N.Y. Univ. Press)
(1999)).
203. See id. at 193 (citing K.K. Schutte et al., A Ten-Year Follow-Up of Older Former Problem
Drinkers: Risk of Relapse and Implications of Successfully Sustained Remission, 64 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 367, 373 (2003)).
204. See White, supra note 202, at 196.
205. DORIS, supra note 97, at 28-61 (discussing situationist studies that challenge the belief that
people have fixed characters leading to predictable behavior).
206. For example, the Stanford Prison Experiment was made into two movies and inspired a
third. DAS EXPERIMENT (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2001) (inspired by the Stanford Prison Experiment);
THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT (IFC Films 2015) (documentary re-enacting the experiment);
QUIET RAGE: THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT (Stanford University 1988) (documentary about
the experiment).
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guarding other students who were playing the role of prisoners.207 Stanley
Milgram conducted another set of famous experiments in which college
students followed orders to deliver an electrical shock to another student,
despite feedback that the shocks were extremely painful. 20 8 Later studies
were unsuccessful in identifying personality traits that correlated with
whether a study participant would obey or defy orders to torture a fellow
student.2 0 9 It seems, rather, that the students behavior was shaped not by
their personalities but by the situation-the context of the experiment.
Of course, these experiments are subject to the same critique as all
laboratory studies of human behavior: whether the studies have ecological
validity. Will people behave the same way in real life? Perhaps. Field stud-
ies of behavior during war and genocide confirm that people's behavior
changes dramatically in radically different social contexts. 2 10 Pen-and-pa-
per psychological tests appear to depend on context as well. Even the My-
ers Briggs test, which I took as a law student to learn if I had the suitable
personality to be a trial lawyer,2 11 does not produce consistent results in
the same person across time and situation.2 12
To be clear, the situational studies of behavior do not deny the corre-
lation between traits and behavior.213 Rather, they demonstrate less corre-
lation than one would expect if personality traits steered human behav-
ior.214 Context and situation seem to influence behavior in dramatic ways.
Perhaps because of the salience of context, the aggregate correlation be-
tween traits and behavior does not result in a reliable way to predict indi-
vidual behavior across time and context.215
More recent neuroscience studies go further to demonstrate long-last-
ing changes to the structure and functioning of the brain based on environ-
mental stimuli. 2 16 Neuroplasticity suggests that, insofar as the changes in
our brain manifest stability, we change in our very biology and structure.2 17
Changes in the brain are often "precipitated by a person's experience with
207. Ali Banuazizi & Siamak Movahedi, Interpersonal Dynamics of a Simulated Prison: A
Methodological Analysis, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 152, 152 (1975); QUIET RAGE, supra note 206.
208. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 17-18 (1974); Stanley Milgram, Behav-
ioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 371-72 (1963).
209. Alan C. Elms & Stanley Milgram, Personality Characteristics Associated with Obedience
and Defiance Toward Authoritative Command, I J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. PERSONALITY 282, 288
(1966).
210. See, e.g., Charles H. Anderton, Genocide: Perspectives from the Social Sciences 15-21
(College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 15-09, 2015).
211. The test suggested my personality was incompatible with trial lawyering, but I became a
trial lawyer anyway and liked it.
212. Malcolm Gladwell, Personality Plus, NEW YORKER, Sept. 20, 2004, at 1, 42.
213. DORIS, supra note 97, at 73.
214. See id. at 75.
215. Id. at 73-75.
216. See supra Part II.C.1.
217. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 17, 34 (2018) (not-
ing that "the decision-maker himself has changed between two points in time.").
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the outside world." 2 18 Our ability to make decisions is thus "malleable and
dependent" on our experiences. 2 19 We do not yet know much about what
environmental factors change people. Yet, some research demonstrates
that motivated people can change even seemingly stable aspects of their
personality with the proper, helpful interventions.2 2 0
4. Criminology: The Age-Crime Curve
While social science and neuroscience studies have demonstrated
how adults change in response to learning and environment, criminology
has long noted that criminal behavior tends to decreases in the second half
of life.22 1 Although the age-crime curve has been the subject of some
scholarly controversy, centering on whether it is as "invariant" and
whether it is as significant as it appears, 2 2 2 its general trend has been doc-
umented for more than 100 years.22 3
Reduced rates of reoffending begin, on average, in the fourth decade
of life. 22 4 The U.S. Sentencing Commission's data on rearrest rates are in-
structive. While more than half of offenders under thirty years old will be
rearrested, the rate of rearrest continues to drop throughout the second half
of life. Of defendants in their forties, 35.9% reoffend. However, just 21.7%
of defendants in their fifties reoffend.22 5 Even people who commit violent
crimes tend to desist from violent crime within five to ten years, with ces-
sation usually occurring in the mid to late thirties.226 This data has the po-
tential to shift our views on incapacitation and rehabilitation as responses
227
to crime.
218. Id. at 30 (citing Draganski et al., supra note 152, at 133 (discussing a study that demon-
strates learning to juggle can result in changes to the grey and white matter of the brain)).
219. Bair, supra note 217, at 32.
220. Sander Hermsen et al., Using Feedback Through Digital Technology to Disrupt and Change
Habitual Behavior: A Critical Review of Current Literature, 57 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 61, 64-65
(2016).
221. Raymond E. Collins, Onset and Desistance in Criminal Careers: Neurobiology and the
Age-Crime Relationship, 39 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION, no. 3, 2004, at 2-3 (summarizing a cen-
tury of scholarship establishing the "age-crime curve").
222. Matt DeLisi, Age-Crime Curve and Criminal Career Patterns, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 134, at 51, 51-53 (discussing various challenges
to, and explanations of, the age-crime curve).
223. Collins, supra note 221 (summarizing a century of scholarship establishing the "age-crime
curve").
224. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEw 23 (2016) (finding that, of prisoners released or put on probation in 2005,
prisoners under age twenty-one had a 67.6% rearrest rate and prisoners over age sixty had a 16.0%
rearrest rate). There are exceptions to the age-crime curve. For example, Michael O'Hear notes a sig-
nificant number of Wisconsin prisoners who were convicted after the age of sixty for sex crimes in-
volving children. Michael M. O'Hear, Who Are the Old Folks in Prison? Part II, MARQ. U. L. SCH.
FAC. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2019), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2019/01/who-are-the-old-folks-in-
prison-part-ii.
225. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 224, at A-I.
226. Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/03/22/sunday-review/too-old-to-commit-crime.html (citing Alfred Blumstein's re-
search at Carnegie Mellon).
227. See id.
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The age-crime curve creates a "stinging irony" for people sentenced
to life in prison as career criminals or habitual offenders. 2 2 8 As John Pfaff
notes, by the time the person has enough prior convictions to qualify for
sentencing enhancements as a recidivist, the person is much more likely
to be on the verge of aging out of his peak offending years and, in fact,
may already be on the declining side of the bell curve. "Locking them up
and throwing away the key ignores the fact that someone who acts vio-
lently when he's eighteen years old may very well be substantially calmer
by the time he's thirty-five."2 29
Desistance with age, however, is not the only type of change that oc-
curs in adulthood. If the studies demonstrating neuroplasticity and person-
ality change discussed above are correct, criminology may find other cor-
relates with crime desistance--correlates that relate to environmental
stimuli and learning.
Not surprisingly, some researchers studying factors that might lead a
person to persist or desist from committing crimes have turned their atten-
tion to recent developments in neuroscience in order to better understand
changes in behavior throughout the lifespan.2 3 0 New criminal justice theo-
ries like the "social control theory" consider the relationship between the
age-crime curve and "normal neurochemistry." 231 Neurotransmitters asso-
ciated with aggression, such as dopamine, decrease with age, while neu-
rotransmitters that moderate aggression, such as serotonin, increase with
age.232 Normal neurobiology thus provides another component that is
shifting the paradigm of developmental criminology.233
New directions in developmental criminology include a move away
from typology of offenders toward the study of situational factors associ-
ated with criminal behavior at different ages.234 The clearest departure
228. See PFAFF, supra note 139, at 192.
229. See id at 191.
230. See, e.g., Anthony Walsh, Crazy By Design: A Biosocial Approach to theAge-Crime Curve,
in BIOSOCIAL CRIMINOLOGY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 154, 160 (Anthony Walsh
& Kevin M. Beaver eds., 2008); Daniel M. Blonegin, Explaining the Relationship Between Age and
Crime: Contributions from the Developmental Literature on Personality, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV.
89, 89 (2010); Collins, supra note 221, at 12 (discussing whether recent neural theories provide a
context for understanding criminal behavior through the human lifespan).
231. Collins, supra note 221, at 12-15 (discussing the possible relationship between age-related
decline in neurotransmitters, such as norepinephrine and Gamma-Aminobutyric Acid, with desistence
from crime).
232. Id. at 5.
233. See id at 16.
234. See, e.g., Per-Olof H. Wikstr6m, The Social Origins ofPathways in Crime: Towards a De-
velopmental Ecological Action Theory of Crime Involvement and Its Changes, in INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENTAL AND LIFE-COURSE THEORIES OF OFFENDING 211, 212-15 (David P. Farrington ed.,
2005) (explaining the Situational Action Theory that the decision to break moral rules is influenced
by situational factors such as temptation and provocation, which interact with individual factors, such
as choice and perception); Terrence P. Thornberry & Marvin D. Krohn, Applying Interactional Theory
to the Explanation of Continuity and Change in Antisocial Behavior, in INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENTAL AND LIFE-COURSE THEORIES OF OFFENDING, supra, at 183, 190 (evaluating the sig-
nificance of factors such as neuropsychological deficits and criminogenic environments on antisocial
behavior at different ages of childhood and young adulthood).
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from a typology of offenders toward a situational view of offending is of-
fered by Sampson and Laub. 235 They are highly critical of the vein of de-
velopmental criminology that uses early life events as static risk factors to
predict that a person is the type to persist in crime throughout his life.23 6
Instead, they study why people stop committing crimes in response to im-
portant life events, such as starting a family and obtaining work.2 37 Be-
cause life events can lead to changed behavior, they caution against pre-
dicting recidivism, and encourage research on events and contexts that
might lead people from different backgrounds and circumstances to desist
from criminal behavior. 2 3 8 Their work may understate the strength of re-
search correlating static risk factors from childhood with adult offending
behavior. 2 39 But their point may be, more generally, that earlier research
does not account for all of the dynamic ways in which life events can
change people. To ignore these dynamic factors that produce change is to
miss an opportunity to develop a body of knowledge about what works to
increase desistence from crime.24 0
A clear contribution of the newer criminology studies is its conclu-
sion that it is "never too late to intervene," meaning that, if dynamic risk
factors that occur later in life can be altered, people with persistent patterns
of criminal conduct may change.241 This is especially important given the
discipline's confession that "long-term predictions are flawed and imper-
fect, and early risk factors do not always predict long-term criminal career
outcomes."2 42
5. Revolution in Our Theory of Change
The above survey consists of only a fraction of the research that sug-
gests a revolution in how scientists think about adult personality traits and
the capacity to change. Social science research demonstrates the mallea-
bility and contextual aspects of personality and behavior, and neuroplas-
ticity now supplies a concrete view of brain changes.
235. Robert J. Samson & John H. Laub, A General Age-Graded Theory of Crime: Lessons
Learned and the Future of Life-Course Criminology, in INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENTAL AND LIFE-
COURSE THEORIES OF OFFENDING, supra note 222, at 165, 165.
236. See id. at 179.
237. Id. at 167-70.
238. See id at 179-80.
239. See David P. Farrington et al., The Development of Offending From Age 8 to Age 50: Recent
Results from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, 92 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR
KRIMINOLOGIE UND STRAFRECHTSREFORM 160, 167, (2009) (finding that early risk factors are signif-
icant in predicting who would persist in criminal behavior in later life).
240. See Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course View of the Development of Crime,
602 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13-14 (2005) (arguing against using childhood and
adolescent risk factors to create typologies of who will persist or desist from crime). "What works" is
a reference and rejoinder to Martinson's claim that nothing works to reduce recidivism. Robert Mar-
tinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, no. 41,
Spring 1974, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
241. Morizot & Kazemian, supra note 134, at 8.
242. Id.
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe every area of study
that challenges the belief that adults are fixed and incapable of change. To
be sure, many studies report contradictory findings on the trajectory of
change, and not all changes represent growth. Moreover, we should pro-
ceed with a caveat always in place when generalizing about a group of
people, like an age cohort. One should expect great variability among
adults of different age groups. This variability has been particularly evi-
dent in studies of adult risk-taking.24 3 We expect people to become more
risk-averse as they age, but some studies of gambling and risky financial
investments demonstrate that older people are no less likely to take risks
than younger people. 24 Moreover, older adults demonstrate high rates of
variability in their willingness to take risks.24 5
But, at the very least, the studies demonstrate that change continues
throughout life, and environmental stimuli are pivotal in determining the
direction of certain changes. Given that change is influenced by environ-
mental stimuli and variables among individuals, it would be difficult to
predict that a thirty-year-old defendant will not be a different person at
forty-five years old. It seems likely that he will change, and in ways we
cannot predict. Yet we can say, generally, that he will be less likely to
commit a crime.
As Thomas Kuhn argued, scientific revolutions often follow a pattern
in which a scientific theory is called into question by anomalies in research
findings.24 6 These anomalies can produce a kind of crisis in the field of
study, characterized by a "proliferation of competing articulations, the
willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the re-
course to philosophy and debate over fundamentals ... "247 If the anoma-
lies cannot be explained within the framework of the scientific theory, a
new theory forms within the relevant scientific community to accommo-
date the anomalies. 248 The new theory will survive if it is logically coher-
ent, broad in scope, explains the data, yields accurate predictions, and in-
vites development of further areas of study.2 49
While I am not positioned to claim that the relevant scientific com-
munities are undergoing what Kuhn called a "paradigm shift," I suggest a
similar "revolution" is taking place in popular, folk beliefs about human
243. Rui Mata et al., Age Differences in Risky Choice: A Meta-Analysis, 1235 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCL 18, 27 (2011) (describing variability in risk-taking behaviors among all age cohorts but
noting no marked reduction in risk-taking behavior in older adults).
244. See id. at 26-27.
245. See Ben Eppinger et al., Better or Worse than Expected? Aging, Learning, and the ERN, 46
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 521, 536 (2008).
246. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 91 (1970) (4th ed.
2012); see also Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology
and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2183, 2194 (1994) ("Science came to be seen not as a grad-
ual, relentless accumulation of knowledge ... but as a succession of superseded theories .....
247. KUHN, supra note 246, at 91.
248. See id at 53.
249. See id.
2019] 183
184 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1
thinking and behavior. 25 0 The significance of neuroplasticity to our beliefs
about adult capacity to change cannot be overemphasized. It has been
called a "revolutionary discovery,"2 5 1 that has already permeated our folk
psychology. Popular literature abounds with reports, ideas, and sugges-
tions for changing our brains so that we might change our behaviors and
thoughts. 25 2 We need only look at the endless news articles reporting stud-
ies that challenge our traditional beliefs about decision-making and human
change, 2 5 3 as well as the numerous self-help publications on "training the
brain" to change behavior.25 4 The new folk belief about the human mind
is that it possesses a life-long capacity to change based on environmental
stimulus, and that decision-making is less clearly a product of fixed per-
sonality or character.
The popular buzz about training one's brain may sound unduly en-
thusiastic and unjustifiably optimistic. Part of the enthusiasm for adopting
the view that people change, however, has come from studies on how be-
lieving people change effects outlook and behavior. As discussed above,
the very belief that people can change impacts judgment and behavior in
specific ways.25 5 Carol Dweck notes that a "growth mindset" has "become
a buzzword" in business circles. The idea of a growth mindset is based on
the central finding in Dweck's research. People who believe they can im-
prove through practice-people endorsing the "incremental theory" of
personality-succeed in improving target behaviors more than people who
believe that ability (intelligence and talent) are immutable characteris-
tics. 2 5 6 Advising businesses on adopting a growth mindset, Dweck cau-
tions against a Pollyanna-ish approach that focuses on simply believing
250. As Alex Rosenberg noted in an opinion piece in the New York Times, "It seems hardly a
week goes by without another article in the media reporting counterintuitive laboratory findings by
empirical psychologists studying cognition, emotion and sensation. What makes many of these results
remarkable is their consistent violation of expectations, assumptions and prejudices forced on us by
our own conscious awareness." Alex Rosenberg, Why You Don't Know Your Own Mind, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/opinion/why-you-dont-know-your-own-
mind.html.
251. DOIDGE, supra note 120, at xvii.
252. See, e.g., SHARON BEGLEY, TRAIN YOUR MIND, CHANGE YOUR BRAIN: How A NEW
SCIENCE REVEALS OUR EXTRAORDINARY POWER TO TRANSFORM OURSELVES (2007); Amy Morin,
How to Train Your Brain to Think Differently, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.psy-
chologytoday.com/us/blog/what-mentally-strong-people-dont-do/201710/how-train-your-brain-
think-differently (recounting neuroimaging studies demonstrating changes in the brain as a result of
cognitive-behavioral therapy).
253. See, e.g., Bret Stetka, The Neuroscience of Changing Your Mind, SCI. AM. (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-neuroscience-of-changing-your-mind/ (reporting on a
functional MRI-based study demonstrating that complex processes are involved in changing a course
of thinking and behavior once it has begun).
254. See, e.g., BEGLEY, supra note 252; Morin, supra note 252.
255. Yeager et al., supra note 24.
256. Carol Dweck, What Having a "Growth Mindset" Actually Means, HARVARD BUS. REV.
ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/what-having-a-growth-mindset-actually-means; Har-
vard Business Review Staff, How Companies Can Profit from a "Growth Mindset ", HARVARD BUS.
REV. ONLINE (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/1 1/how-companies-can-profit-from-a-growth-mind-
set.
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that people can change for the better and instructs, instead, that businesses
implement institutional structures to support growth.25 7
The science of adult change may be adopted more quickly in the
world of business development than in criminal justice,2 58 but its applica-
tion to sentencing is clear. Whether we believe that people can change di-
rectly impacts our punitive response to their harmful actions. Belief that
personality is fixed correlates with punitive attitudes toward wrongdo-
ers. 259 The idea that people do not change correlates with "bad-person at-
tributions" which, in turn, correlates with the desire to seek violent revenge
against the "bad person," 26 0 or to permanently incapacitate him because he
is dangerous. In contrast, belief that people change incrementally over
time correlates with nonpunitive solutions to conflict, like forgiveness and
rehabilitation.2 6' Simply holding the belief that personality is malleable
can reduce expressions of shame and retaliation in response to "social ad-
versity." 262
What are we to make of how little we can explain or predict behavior?
Doris points out that "[r]obust traits and evaluatively integrated personal-
ity structures are constructs that underwrite substantial stretches of evalu-
ative discourse, but these stretches too often enable unfair condemnations,
on the one hand, and unwarranted approbation, on the other." 263 An em-
pirically informed ethical system would, he suggests, be very hesitant to
base its evaluations of people on conclusions about their fixed character
or even simply a pattern of past conduct. He urges that "evaluative dis-
course would be better purged of globalist connotations." 26 4 If the "glob-
alist connotations" associated with criminal behavior in adulthood are that
the defendant is characterologically criminal, what would sentencing look
like if it was purged of that mistaken, folk belief in the permanence of the
trait of criminality? The next Part addresses this question.
257. Harvard Business Review Staff, supra note 256.
258. I do not take a position on the usefulness of self-help and business motivation books, in
general. For an overview of that landscape, see Alexandra Schwartz, Improving Ourselves to Death:
What the Self-Help Gurus and Their Critics Reveal About Our Times, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/improving-ourselves-to-death (surveying self-
help publications and their critics).
259. See Chi-yue Chiu et al., Implicit Theories and Conceptions ofMorality, 73 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 923, 931-32 (1997); see also Gervey et al., supra note 127, at 27 (discussing entity
theorist belief in fixed moral character prompting question, "what type of person is this?" and making
judgments of guilt accordingly).
260. Yeager et al., supra note 128, at 1101-03.
261. Chiu et al., supra note 259; Gervey et al., supra note 127, at 22; Michael P. Haselhuhn et
al., How Implicit Beliefs Influence Trust Recovery, 21 PSYCHOL. Sc. 645, 647 (2010).
262. See David S. Yeager et al., Implicit Theories ofPersonality and Attributions ofHostile In-
tent. A Meta-Analysis, an Experiment, and a Longitudinal Intervention, 84 CHILD DEV. 1651, 1665
(2013).
263. DORIS, supra note 97, at 116.
264. Id. at 117.
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III. THE RELEVANCE OF ADULT CHANGE TO SENTENCING
In this Part, I begin by briefly outlining some challenges that the sci-
ence of adult change poses to the traditional goals of sentencing. I then
offer two principles-supported by the science of adult change-upon
which a new theory of sentencing can be based: (1) a presumption of in-
clusion, and against judgments of permanent condemnation; and (2) gov-
ernment accountability for the type of change that occurs as a result of
imprisonment and other criminal justice interventions. In the second Sec-
tion, I consider some practical applications of both principles but conclude
that the recommendations have undeniable limitations. Ultimately, the
constant and contextual nature of adult change seems to call for a more
fundamental shift in our response to crime.
A. Applying the Science ofAdult Change to Sentencing Theory
Sentencing may serve any of four goals: retribution, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and deterrence. 265 Deterrence may be either specific-de-
signed to deter the defendant from committing the crime again--or gen-
eral-designed to deter others from committing crime.2 66 As I discuss in
the Introduction, incapacitation looms large in U.S. sentencing because it
aims to completely prevent the defendant's future crimes by excluding the
defendant from society.
Incapacitation as a sentencing goal, however, tends to lack internal
limits. The impossibility of achieving a completely safe, crime-free world
means that there is always impetus to enhance incapacitative responses to
crime.26 7 Nowhere is this clearer than in habitual offender enhancement
cases, where a defendant is sentenced to life in prison based on prior con-
victions. In Ewing v. Calhfornia,2 68 for example, the defendant was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years to life for stealing golf clubs as a repeat of-
fender.269 While many would agree that stealing golf clubs does not merit,
on retributivist grounds, decades in prison, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
jected an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge to Ewing's sen-
tence on the ground that the state could legitimately imprison a repeat of-
fender for decades to serve the goal of public safety. 270 The state may in-
capacitate repeat offenders for life, even if their crimes are not particularly
serious.
Yet, in speaking of utitilarian goals of punishment, such as deterrence
and incapacitation, Jeremy Bentham argued for a "frugality" principle:
265. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (listing deterrence, incapacitation, retribution,
and rehabilitation as legitimate penological goals).
266. Richard Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 371-
72 (1997).
267. Simon, supra note 57, at 282, 293 (noting that, if, for example, the goal is to perfect public
safety, "total" incapacitation will appear justified).
268. 538 U.S. 11.
269. Id. at 28, 30-31.
270. Id. at 29-31.
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that punishment should inflict no pain greater than what is required to ac-
complish the goal of the punishment. Bentham's "frugality" principle,
which is referred to today as a "parsimony" principle, applies to punish-
ments intended to incapacitate the dangerous.271 Bentham referred to inca-
pacitative punishments as "disablement" and expressed concern that the
defendant who was imprisoned, banished, or put to death would likely be
punished in excess of the punishment's goal.272 Applying Bentham's fru-
gality principle to Ewing, it seems likely that Mr. Ewing's incapacitation
offended the principle of parsimony in many ways, but, at the very least,
by extending his prison sentence beyond the point in time when Mr. Ewing
would pose a threat to public safety. Parsimony requires that the defendant
not be incapacitated if he is not a danger to public safety.
As a preliminary matter, one could factor the age-crime curve into
Mr. Ewing's sentencing. 273 As John Pfaff has pointed out, a life sentence
"ignores the fact that someone who acts violently when he's eighteen years
old may very well be substantially calmer by the time he's thirty-five." 27 4
Ewing was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life when he was in
his thirties.2 75 Yet, with every passing year, he was statistically less likely
to reoffend.276 His life sentence was, thus, excessive to the goal of inca-
pacitation to protect public safety considering the age-crime curve.2 77
The science of adult change, however, implies an even greater chal-
lenge to incapacitatory sentencing than the application age-crime curve.
Change may occur long before actuarial analysis predicts "aging out" of
crime, depending on the defendant's exposure to a new experiences or en-
vironments.2 7 8 In this sense, adults present a version of the problem that
the U.S. Supreme Court outlined for juveniles in Roper and Graham. We
cannot, at the outset, sort out who will reoffend and who will not, because
we do not know how they will change over time.
Sentences, of course, also can be justified based on their retributive,
deterrent, or rehabilitative functions. Although not responsive to every
goal of sentencing, the science of adult change should influence sentenc-
ing in some of these areas as well. Specifically, the neuropsychological
consequences of prison may frustrate the goals of rehabilitation and spe-
cific deterrence.
271. See BENTHAM, supra note 106, at 142, 151.
272. Id. at 152-53 (expressing concern that incapacitation prevents the punished person from
doing good in the future).
273. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Life Without Parole Under Modern Theories ofPunishment, in
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 138, 143.
274. PFAFF, supra note 139, at 191.
275. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 20.
276. Cf id. at 26.
277. Cf id at 30. 1 also note that it is questionable whether nonviolent larceny threatens public
safety in a way that justifies imprisonment.
278. See Sampson & Laub, supra note 240, at 41.
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The pains of imprisonment-intended and incidental-are mani-
fold,27 9 but deprivation is one common denominator. The incarcerated per-
son is deprived of family life, natural environments, variety in environ-
ment and food, many forms of work and leisure, and so forth. These dep-
rivations may be entirely deserved from a retributivist's perspective. 28 0 But
deprivations do more than simply inflict pain. They produce neurobiolog-
ical changes in incarcerated people.
The neurobiological effects of prison are currently the subject of de-
bate and study. Certainly, traumatic violence and the threat of violence
causes brain change. 2 8 1 Other aspects of long-term incarceration "can stim-
ulate the same negative emotional feelings and behavioral tendencies that
have been consistently identified as risk factors of antisocial conduct, es-
pecially violence."2 82 It is likely, for example, that putting humans in iso-
lated cells for long periods of time damages the brain by reducing cortical
volume and weakening the connections between neurons.28 3 Not limited
to isolation, factors such as overcrowding and high noise levels are also
associated with brain changes that negatively impact social, emotional,
and cognitive functioning.28 4 Other studies have led researchers to posit
that prison damages emotional functioning by reducing growth and repair
of neurons in areas of the brain necessary for emotional capacity and reg-
ulation.285
Neurological compromise caused by the experience of imprisonment
should come as no surprise. Earlier psychological studies demonstrated
the same through behavioral analysis and interviews with formerly incar-
cerated people. 2 8 6 Criminologists have observed that prison is a "crimino-
genic" environment that encourages criminal behavior.287 But the neuro-
logical data makes a contribution, as it always does, in providing visible-
and therefore persuasive-evidence of brain change. Adult brains, like ad-
olescent brains, can change for the worse in response to environmental
stimuli.
279. See GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY
PRISON 64 (1958).
280. See, e.g., John M. Darley, Citizens'Assignments ofPunishments for Moral Transgressions:
A Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101, 114 (2010) (discussing
the retributive aspects of folk theories of blame and punishment).
281. Mika'il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
257, 258-62 (2013).
282. See Coppola, supra note 172.
283. Arielle R. Baskin-Sommers & Karelle Fontaneau, Correctional Change Through Neurosci-
ence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 427-30 (2016) (discussing human and nonhuman studies of the neu-
rological impact of solitary confinement and social deprivation).
284. Coppola, supra note 172.
285. Coppola, supra note 172.
286. Craig Haney, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 584, 584-85 (John Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (discuss-
ing the psychological effects of prison).
287. Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1054-73 (2008)
(discussing research and perspectives on the criminogenic effects of incarceration).
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The argument I make here is not simply that prison harms, but that
prison harms in specific ways that frustrate both the goals of rehabilitation
and specific deterrence. The brain changes outlined above decrease capac-
ity to make decisions; reduce the chance that the defendant could, in the
future, weigh the costs of committing another crime; and reduce the social-
emotional intelligence needed for empathy, perspective-taking, and deci-
sion-making that takes into account the needs of others.28 8
The above-listed cognitive skills are associated with desistance from
future criminal activity, whether through a broad notion of rehabilita-
289
tion, or a narrower notion of deterrence in which the former offender
rationally chooses not to reoffend so that he will not endure the same pun-
ishment.
To be sure, other goals of sentencing may be in the forefront in some
cases, including the goals of retribution and general deterrence. If, how-
ever, the damage done by imprisonment is unaccounted for at sentencing,
the pains of imprisonment may far exceed the punishment intended to
serve retributive goals. 2 9 0 The punishment of prison may be more destruc-
tive than accounted for in a "just deserts" analysis.
While the science of adult change empirically challenges the goals of
incapacitation, retribution, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation-as well
as their their parsimonious application-it also suggests a fundamental
shift in orientation. It supports the views of a chorus of scholars calling for
a better theory of sentencing. 29 1 Although I do not offer a comprehensive
theory here, I suggest some guiding principles for any new theory of sen-
tencing in the next Section.
288. See Coppola, supra note 172.
289. Whether a prison can serve a rehabilitative function has been a matter debated throughout
U.S. history. The U.S. penitentiary experiment of the late 1700s and early 1800s began with an effort
to provide spaces for repentance and reform See CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN
IMAGINATION 2-3 (2009). Yet, particularly in the federal system, imprisonment is not conceived as
having a rehabilitative function. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (stating that "imprisonment is not an ap-
propriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation"); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319,
322 (2011).
290. Retributivism can-at least in theory-serve a limiting function; punishment should be no
greater than what is deserved. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-76 (1974) (While
elegant in theory, there is no evidence that retributivist analysis of "just deserts" has served a limiting
function on incarceration or long prison sentences). Within a retributivist framework, other goals of
sentencing-like rehabilitation and deterrence-may be met in ways that do not prolong punishment
beyond the retributivist limit. Christopher Slobogin & Laura Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in
Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REv. 77, 122 (2013) ("In the end, the best way to reconcile retributive and
preventive goals is probably through some sort of limiting retributivism, or what we are calling pre-
ventive justice, which allows utilitarian considerations to have significant impact within a range es-
tablished by retributive principles."). While theoretically compelling, limiting retributivism does not
appear to have influenced the Supreme Court's analysis in Ewing or policy decisions that resulted in
habitual offender statutes discussed in this Article.
291. See generally THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 36.
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B. The Principles ofInclusivity and Reticence to Condemn
The science of adult change presents a normative challenge to prac-
tices that result in permanent exclusion from free society.292 It demands an
orientation of humility toward long-term prediction. Even in an era of ac-
tuarial risk-assessment advances, our predictive powers are less than we
imagine them to be. This renders the idea of the hardened criminal more
speculative, and the binary distinction between the hardened criminal and
the temporarily wayward less trustworthy. This, in turn, supports a moral
orientation towards "more universalistic arguments about redemption, re-
habilitation, mercy, and aging out of crime."29 3
If we are at least "rhetorically committed" to the idea of reintegrating
people convicted of crimes into society,294 then the goal of sentencing
should not be to identify and exclude the criminal.29 5 The principle, then,
might be described as more of a move toward inclusion as a long-term goal
and away from exclusion as a default position. This stands in contrast to
the current default position in which we assume that people who commit
crimes are characterologically criminal and only select a low-risk subset
to benefit from special, rehabilitative programming.2 96 My position is that
the default assumption should be reverse. We should not be looking for
the few temporarily wayward defendants to skim off the top of the criminal
justice system but to assume impermanence of criminal behavior.
The reticence to permanently exclude resonates with the values ex-
pressed by the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Graham, in which Justice
Kennedy critiqued life without parole sentences, stating that they "[pro-
vide] no chance for fulfillment outside the prison walls, no chance of rec-
onciliation with society, no hope."29 7 Reticence to exclude also resonates
with the values in other Western countries. The European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) incorporates the idea of change at any age into its standard
for reviewing life sentences. It held that Article 3, which prohibits torture
and "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" requires that life
sentences be reducible based on "any changes in the life [of the] prisoner
[that] are so significant . .. as to mean that continued detention can no
292. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 97 ("[T]he American carceral system, once to some extent at
least rhetorically committed to reintegration . . . has come explicitly to embrace the opposite approach,
that of permanent exclusion.").
293. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, Lives on the Line: From Capital Punishment to Life
Without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 1,
I 8 (quoting Marie Gottschalk, No Way Out? Life Sentences and the Politics of Penal Reform, in LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 227, 241-42.
294. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 97 ("[T]he American carceral system, once to some extent at
least rhetorically committed to reintegration . . . has come explicitly to embrace the opposite approach,
that of permanent exclusion.").
295. See id. at 98, 100.
296. See, e.g., Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten
Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2007).
297. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
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longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds." 2 98 This acknowl-
edges that punishment should not continue if the person being punished
(or his circumstance) has changed significantly.
The emerging discourse on dignity in sentencing also stands in oppo-
sition to the practice of labeling people as characterologically criminal and
destined for permanent exclusion. To permanently exclude is tantamount
to creating an untouchable caste.29 9 This is not only morally wrong but
empirically unsupportable. Dignity is "constructed through interactions
between the state and the person who falls under the state's gaze, if not its
control." 30 0 Within the context of punishment decisions, dignity can be
construed as the state of belonging-the experience of not being excluded
from society.30 1 To be permanently excluded is to be stripped of dignity.302
If our current system is one of total exclusion, then refraining from
permanent exclusion is the antithesis of our current criminal legal system.
It is radical inclusion, a "reintegrationist theory of punishment" in which
the goal for all is inclusion in the civic body.303 Applications of the princi-
ples of inclusion and reticence to permanently condemn are manifold and
require more complete examination in a separate article. Below, I sketch
out some possibilities and highlight some of the difficulties.
In its most general application, a principle of inclusion should mean
the end of long-term or permanent exclusion from society, whether
through the death penalty, long prison sentences, noncarceral sanctions
like lifetime probation supervision, or collateral consequences that ex-
clude the convicted from participation in civic life.30 4 These punishments
strip people convicted of crimes of "their status as moral and political sub-
jects and [keep them] beyond the bounds of mainstream society." 3 0 5 Here,
I focus on the problem of long prison sentences, which can be addressed
through statutory changes and, often, through discretionary, sentencing
decisions.3 06
The force of the principles of inclusion is most obvious in long prison
sentences that, by design, permanently condemn. One solution is to simply
shorten prison sentences. Shorter sentences reduce the window of error for
false positives, that is, incarcerating people past the time when they pose
298. Vinter v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, 34,44 (2013).
299. See Dolovich, supra note 1, at 97.
300. Fagan, supra note 36, at 311.
301. To completely submit the person who committed the crime to the "ideal of public security"
is really a gross dignity violation. Simon, supra note 57, at 304-05.
302. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 93-94 (2003) (comparing the lack of dignity in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system to European systems where dignity is engrained in the social fabric).
303. Eaglin, supra note 16, at 225.
304. Bennett Capers, Defending Life, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICAS NEW DEATH
PENALTY?, supra note 1, at 180; Dolovich, supra note 1, at 99, 116-17, 119.
305. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 98.
306. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 445-68
(2013) (discussing the potential role for the judiciary in considering aspects of mass incarceration at
sentencing).
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public safety threats. Of course, short sentences may increase the risk of
error on the other side, that is, the release of people who still pose a threat
to public safety. But the risk of false negatives is less problematic than the
risk of false positives, which results in unjustified incarceration. As Jona-
thon Simon argues, to completely submit the person who committed the
crime to the "ideal of public security" is really a gross dignity violation.3 07
The problem with shorter sentences, however, is that they still may
incapacitate people for too long. Even a two-year sentence may be longer
than needed for public safety if the incarcerated person has changed.
The alternative to short prison sentences is longitudinal sentencing-
or indeterminate sentencing-which provides for multiple opportunities
for early release from incarceration. In an indeterminate sentencing re-
gime, legislators set minimum and maximum sentences, which allow for
multiple opportunities to secure release through sentence review and pa-
role consideration. 30 8 Many of the mechanisms for early release from
prison exist but are unevenly or rarely used.3 09 They include parole, resen-
tencing, taking time off the sentence for good behavior ("good time
credit"), and clemency.
Indeterminate sentencing reduces one of the weaknesses of determi-
nate sentencing-attempting to predict long-term risk of reoffense at the
initial sentencing date. A one-time determination of rehabilitative poten-
tial leaves an enormous margin for error given the brain's "plasticity and
capacity for change." 310 Given the unknowable nature of life trajectories,
sentencing decisions should not be final but should allow for multiple op-
portunities for release and reintegration into society.
Indeterminate sentencing was the norm for the first half of the twen-
tieth century but fell into disfavor in the 1980s when the movement toward
determinate sentencing ascended.3 1 1 Starting in the 1990s, the federal sen-
tencing regime, and many state sentencing regimes, foreclosed methods of
early release as part of the "truth in sentencing" movement. 3 12 The punish-
307. Simon, supra note 57, at 304-05.
308. Jorge Renaud discusses the merits of having a "presumption of parole" in his article on
early release strategies. Jorge Renaud, Eight Keys to Mercy: How to Shorten Excessive Prison Sen-
tences, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/longsen-
tences.html#appendix.
309. Regional variation is the norm. Some states continued to use indeterminate sentencing with
robust parole procedures. For an overview of state procedures, see Jorge Renaud, Grading the Parole
Release Systems ofAll 50 States, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.prisonpol-
icy.org/reports/gradingparole.html.
310. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1775
(2012) (discussing the impossibility of being confident in a judgment of a juvenile due to their "plas-
ticity and capacity for change").
311. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1233, 1245 (2005).
312. Several high-profile crimes were committed by people released on parole. Members of the
public were also concerned that a defendant who received a "life sentence" could be released after ten
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ment literature discusses at length the reasons why indeterminate sentenc-
ing fell into disfavor.3 13 Early release decisions faced criticism from the
public, particularly when a parolee committed a serious crime upon re-
lease. 314 At the same time, incarcerated people and their advocates criti-
cized the arbitrariness, opacity, and discriminatory way in which release
decisions were made. 315 Nonetheless, executive release decisions, like pa-
role, clemency, and commutation, have continued to be practiced in some
jurisdictions, while others, like the federal criminal system, abandoned pa-
role altogether.3 16
As a result of growing recognition of the U.S. status as an outlier in
the number of people it incarcerates and the length of their prison sen-
tences, the past fifteen years have been marked by renewed interest in
mechanisms for early release.3 17 The American Law Institute, for example,
has approved changes to the Model Penal Code (MPC) to allow prisoners
who have served fifteen years or more to petition a federal judge for a
sentencing review. 3 18 The Charles Colson Task Force on Federal Correc-
tions (Task Force) adopted the "second look" provision, which it proposed
to Congress in 2016.319 In endorsing this second look approach, the Task
Force noted that the abolition of federal parole resulted in the end of op-
portunity to review rehabilitation progress in prisoners and offer release
on a merit basis. The Task Force noted:
"The 'age-crime' curve shows that the likelihood of committing of-
fenses in the future drops sharply beginning at age [forty]. After spend-
years. The "Life Means Life" slogan was emblematic of a strain of political response to crime that
promised permanent incarceration and exclusion of anyone who might pose a future danger. Jorge
Renaud discusses the merits of having a "presumption of parole" in his article on early release strate-
gies. Renaud, supra note 308.
313. Tonry, supra note 311, at 1245-59 (discussing the critique of indeterminate sentencing).
314. In Maryland, for example, on the heels of a homicide committed by a prisoner while on
temporary work-release from prison, the governor announced that he would no longer agree to the
parole release of people serving life sentences. Lila Meadows, Realizing "Meaningful" in Maryland:
A Call for Reforming Maryland's Parole System in Light of Graham, Miller, & Montgomery, 48 U.
BALT. L.F. 59, 62 (2018).
315. See Tonry, supra note 311, at 1254-60.
316. One form of "early release" is the receipt of set sentence discounts for good behavior in
prison. "Good time credits" were much less controversial than discretionary parole and clemency and
enjoyed support throughout the "truth-in-sentencing" era. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Pa-
role, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 11-12 (2013).
317. See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Second Looks, Second Chances, 41 CARDOZo L. REv. 83, 95-96
(2019).
318. Model Penal Code: Sentencing, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (April 10, 2017),
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/sentencing/#drafts; Model Penal Code: Sentencing Approved,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (May 24, 2017), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/model-penal-code-sen-
tencing-approved/.
319. See CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FED. CORR, TRANSFORMING PRISONS, RESTORING
LIvEs, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FED. CORR. 46 (2016).
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ing more than a decade in prison, many aging, even once violent, indi-
viduals represent little threat to public safety. For this group of people,
any societal benefit of incarceration has long since been achieved." 320
Fifteen years is still a dramatically long period of time in the life of a
human being. Given our limited ability to predict reoffense, sentences
should probably be reviewed at least every five years or less. Nonetheless,
the MPC's proposal captures the emerging concern for needlessly long
terms of incarceration and provides a potential vehicle for developing
"second look" mechanisms. Sentence review is particularly important
when executive release decisions through parole and clemency fail to pro-
vide a meaningful opportunity for release.32 1
The empirical evidence of change throughout the lifespan appears to
logically call for indeterminate sentencing, yet, it is problematic for many
reasons. Clemency, for example, was revived in President Obama's ad-
ministration through a more robust administrative process of screening
and release. 32 2 Clemency is characterized by almost limitless executive
discretion and, thus, results in idiosyncratic release decisions.32 3
portantly, release decisions cannot be counted on because they reflect the
priorities of the executive. One need only note the speed with which Pres-
ident Obama's clemency initiative was dismantled at the completion of his
final term in office. 32 4
The process of parole release is more structured than clemency, and
usually involves a decision-making process set out in statutes and regula-
tions. Parole release decisions include review of institutional records, risk
and needs assessment instruments, and clinical interviews to determine
whether to grant release. Parole was a common means of releasing prison-
ers who demonstrated reform. Before the 1990s, even people convicted of
murder were expected to be paroled and rejoin society.32 5
Although the parole process is more robust and structured than clem-
ency and commutation, it also presents significant problems: the parole
320. Id. at 47 (citing Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 341 (2009); Robert J. Sampson &
John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters? Trajectories ofCrime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age
70, 41 CRIM[NOLOGY 301, 311-12 (2003)).
321. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Modifying Unjust Sentences, 49 GA. L. REV. 433, 452-53 (2015)
(arguing, generally, for greater judicial power to reduce and modify sentences and, specifically, in
instances with mentally ill prisoners).
322. See THE MERCY LOTTERY: A REVIEW OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S CLEMENCY
INITIATIVE, CENTER ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW AT NYU LAW SCH. 5 (2018).
323. Id. at 5, 28-31 (discussing the limited number of releases in light of other meritorious clem-
ency petitions, and proposing changes to the clemency process). But, for a thoughtful analysis of how
clemency could be reinvigorated and restructured to provide nonarbitrary means of early release, see
Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Retructuring Clemency: The Cost ofIgnoring Clemency and a Plan
for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015).
324. See Sari Horowitz, Obama to Commute Hundreds of Federal Drug Sentences in Final
Grants of Clemency, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/obama-to-commute-hundreds-of-federal-drug-sentences-in-final-grants-of-clem-
ency/2017/01/16/c99b4ba6-da5e-1 I e6-b8b2-cb5164beba6bstory.html.
325. Id.
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process (1) lacks meaningful judicial review; (2) still requires the releasing
authority to predict future behavior, a task this Article argues is exception-
ally difficult; and (3) can have the effect of coercing prisoners into intru-
sive therapeutic regimes. I address these concerns seriatim here.
First, parole release decisions are notoriously discretionary and im-
mune from meaningful judicial review. 32 6 There is no constitutional right
to parole, and the due process protections to which the parole applicant is
entitled are limited by the degree to which the controlling statute appears
to create a parole right.327 Any process deemed adequate by state law is
usually enough. 3 28 This renders parole release vulnerable to arbitrariness
and discrimination without the possibility of meaningful review.329
Parole release decisions can be arbitrary because they are based on
"a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and
what he may become rather than simply what he has done." 3 30 Even at-
tempts to standardize release decisions by using actuarial tools like risk
assessments have not alleviated concerns that release decisions are dis-
criminatory. Because predicting which defendants have the lowest risk of
reoffense is done with actuarial tools that reflect preexisting racial dispar-
ities, rehabilitative diversion reflects the pernicious racial disparity in the
criminal legal system as a whole.33 '
Should we return to a regime of indeterminate sentencing that relies
on parole, the judiciary must expand its review of parole release decisions
so that the parole process is fair and prison conditions do not subvert the
326. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1307, 1307 (2007) (identifying parole as an understudied aspect of "hidden sentencing"). The Prison
Policy Initiative created a rubric to grade state parole systems. Renaud, supra note 308. Sixteen states
abolished discretionary parole, meaning that they provide no mechanism for releasing a person who
has demonstrated exemplary conduct and suitability for release before the maximum sentence date.
The rubric includes process features that are hallmarks of due process, like the right to be present for
a face-to-face hearing with the person charged with deciding on release, the right to challenge incorrect
information about the underlying crime or prison conduct, clearly enumerates in statute or regulations
the grounds for release and denial, allows prisoners to access their files to prepare for the hearing, and
provides a meaningful review process of the parole board's release decision. Notable is the variety of
practices, and the few states that afford a panoply of process safeguards and protections. Prisoners in
some states will receive adverse release decisions without the benefit of an in-person hearing, without
the opportunity to review and comment on the institutional file that forms the basis of the decision,
and without the right to appeal the denial.
327. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (not-
ing that while defendants do not have a constitutional right to release on parole, and, thus, procedural
due process rights, the Court will analyze on a case-by-case basis whether the parole statute in question
has a "unique structure and language" that indicates a "protectable entitlement").
328. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220-21 (2011); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
329. Regarding the arbitrariness of parole decisions among states, see Jorge Renaud, Red States,
Blue States: What Do These Mean for People on Parole?, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/01/02/parole/ (comparing the "hope index," meaning the
chance of being released on parole, in Massachusetts and Texas).
330. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-
Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1960)).
331. See Eaglin, supra note 16, at 214-17.
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purpose of the sentence by failing to provide necessary services.3 32 Legis-
lation must clearly set forth the parole applicant's rights to parole consid-
eration to ensure judicial review is meaningful.333 Moreover, parole re-
lease decisions from life sentences should take on a constitutional dimen-
sion.
In the context of juvenile life sentences, where constitutional con-
straints may implicate parole decisions, the opportunity for release through
parole must be "meaningful" in the sense that it must consider the individ-
ual's course of maturation and rehabilitation. 3 3 4 To pass constitutional
muster, courts should ensure "that parole boards have engaged in the indi-
vidualized, granular determinations that Graham contemplated by consid-
ering and weighing evidence bearing on the offender's specific circum-
stances." 3 States that are grappling with how to provide juveniles serving
life sentences with meaningful opportunities for release provide a partial
framework for thinking about making parole predictable and fair for eve-
ryone. Massachusetts' highest court, for example, held that juveniles serv-
ing life sentences must have at their parole release hearings the assistance
of counsel, funds for expert witnesses, a transcript of the proceedings, a
written decision explaining the basis for a denial or a grant, and judicial
review of the parole board's denial.336
The European model might serve as an example for parole reform by
balancing risk and right to release more effectively. 3 7 European parole
release decisions integrate a belief in the defendant's "capacity to
change."3 38 Most European countries see consideration for release as a
right for all prisoners and require routine consideration for release for all
prisoners serving life sentences.3 39 With regard to assuming the risk that a
released prisoner might reoffend, European countries clarify that release
occurs in spite of the risk of reoffense, and that the risk must be balanced
against the prisoner's recognized liberty interest.340 There is a strong com-
mitment to due process as well as the "underlying values such as human
332. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment,
112 MICH. L. REv. 397, 450-51 (2013) (discussing allocation of sentencing authority to "back-end"
release procedures, which should be constitutionally inspired to be more robust and less arbitrary).
333. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (state statute government parole release decisions created
limited due process rights for prisoners applying for parole).
334. See Bierschbach, supra note 310, at 1779-81 (noting that Graham raises significant ques-
tions about how parole and proportionality analysis intersect and compares individualized considera-
tion in Graham parole hearings with individualized sentencing required in death penalty cases).
335. Id. at 1786. The sentencing court's individualized assessment of rehabilitative potential
would thus be applied to the parole release hearing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-
49 (1949) ("careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders" is necessary because
"[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurispru-
dence").
336. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 358-65 (Mass. 2015).
337. See Dirk van Zyl Smit & Alessandro Corda, American Exceptionalism in Parole Release
and Supervision, in AMERICAN ExCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 410, 465-66 (Kevin R.
Reitz ed., 2017).
338. Id. at 435.
339. Id at 441-42.
340. Id at 448.
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dignity, social reintegration, and the ability to change." 341 Perhaps even
more important, the European system of parole favors a "strong presump-
tion in favor of release at the initial parole eligibility" process.3 42 Finally,
prisoners have the right to challenge a denial of release on parole, and the
review process includes a final appeal to the ECtHR.3 4 3
The second concern raised by longitudinal sentencing applies to all
forms of early release decisions. They do not escape the central conun-
drum of determining risk of reoffense, a prediction I contend is very diffi-
cult given the adult capacity to change. Arguably, risk prediction after sen-
tencing is more accurate because it includes more information about the
incarcerated person's conduct in prison, and the risk assessment may only
attempt to predict immediate behavior upon release. Short-term prediction
accords with best practices in the mental health profession, where clini-
cians have moved away from one-time risk assessments to predict future
dangerousness to longitudinal assessments of the variables of risk of dan-
gerousness.344
The third concern about indeterminate sentencing is its focus on the
therapeutic rehabilitation of the incarcerated person, which can be intru-
sive and even degrading.345 In their bid for release, incarcerated people
might have to undergo psychological testing, participate in group therapy
sessions, and permit the paroling authority unfettered access to mental
health treatment records 346
Predicting future dangerousness is likely to become more intrusive as
neuroscientific technology improves. In some sentencing hearings in the
United States, neuropsychological experts opine on the defendant's unique
features that may challenge culpability, mitigate punishment, or assess fu-
ture risk.3 47 It seems inevitable (and troubling) that brain imaging will one
day become a routine part of the risk assessment process. The Netherlands,
for example, uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans
341. Id. at 450.
342. Id. at 457.
343. Id. at 433. The ECtHR will defer to the country's parole procedures, however. Id. at 435.
344. Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L. Skeen, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific About
Being Dynamic, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 347, 350 (2005) (This shift parallels the shift away
from long-term civil commitment to community-based mental health treatment, while monitoring po-
tential dangerousness over time. The shift has been described as moving from a "violence prediction
model" to a "violence reduction model" with a parallel move toward identifying which dynamic risk
factors reduce the risk of violence and can be controlled through clinical intervention.).
345. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Col-
lectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063,
2082 (2002) (arguing that rehabilitative goals of sentencing result in judges acting as "intrusive, coer-
cive, and unqualified state psychiatrists and behavioral policemen.").
346. See, e.g., Jeremy Isard, Under the Cloak of Brain Science: Risk Assessments, Parole, and
the Powerful Guise of Objectivity, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2017) (discussing California's
parole release risk assessment protocol, which involves actuarial instruments, clinical interviews, as
well as folk consideration of remorse and responsibility).
347. Gur et al., supra note 148, at 559-61 (describing the standard protocol for such assess-
ments); see also Deborah Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neu-
roscience in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 493 (2015) (analyzing defense and prosecution uses of
neuroscience in 800 criminal cases).
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routinely on prisoners.34 Neuroscientists are currently studying whether
brain imaging can predict which mental health and addiction treatments
will be most effective for patients. 3 4 9
While incorporating "neuroprediction" into risk assessments has gar-
nered some supporters, 3 5 0 it has also generated concern. 3 5 1 Not only is it
invasive,3 52 but it may lead to errors based on inadequately confirmed the-
ories about the relationship between fMRI data and human behavior.3 5 3
The science may not be advanced enough to draw conclusions from the
physical findings on brain scans about what the person will do in the fu-
ture. The fact that brains change in response to time and environment com-
pounds this concern.
In sum, indeterminate sentencing accommodates what we now know
about adult capacity to change by providing second looks-opportunities
for release based on demonstrated change. The process of deciding who
and when to release, however, is plagued with problems related to accu-
racy, fairness, and intrusiveness.
C. Accountability for Contexts Producing Change
The science of adult change lends empirical support to a common
intuition that prison frustrates rehabilitation.3 54 To quote a neuroscientist,
"neuroplasticity isn't all good news."3 55 Deprivation and trauma change
the very structure of the brain reshape the incarcerated person in funda-
mentally harmful ways. Acknowledging the physical evidence of brain de-
terioration in response to imprisonment should spur more than a call to
prison reform. It should also spur a call to dramatically reduce incarcera-
tion as a response to crime.
348. See Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction ofFuture Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC.
6223, 6223 (2013) (demonstrating an example of recent studies on neuroprediction).
349. John Gabrieli, A Look Within: Imaging Technologies Could Find the Best Treatments for
Depression and Addiction - and Could Even Reshape Education, 318 SCi. AM., no. 3, 2018, at 56
(reporting on studies finding a correlation between structural brain features and amenability to treat-
ment for depression and likelihood of alcoholic relapse).
350. The term "neuroprediction" was popularized by Thomas Nadelhoffer at Duke University.
Nadelhoffer argues that the science of neuroprediction is reliable enough to be integrated into criminal
risk assessment. See Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Neurolaw and Neuropredic-
tion: Potential Promises and Perils, 7 PHIL. COMPASS 631, 634, 636-37 (2012).
351. Andrew R. Calderon, A Dangerous Brain: Can Neuroscience Predict How Likely Someone
Is To Commit Another Crime?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2018, 10:00 P.M.),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/14/a-dangerous-brain (discussing controversy surround-
ing findings by "neuroprediction" studies by Kent Keihl et al. on the relationship between rearrest
rates and two measures of brain structure and activity).
352. See, e.g., Federica Coppola, Mapping the Brain to Predict Antisocial Behaviour: New Fron-
tiers in Neurocriminology, 'New' Challenges for Criminal Justice, 1 05 NEUROETHICS (forthcoming
2019) (contending that predictive neuroscience implicates privacy and civil liberty concerns).
353. Francis X. Shen and others have argued that the science is not advanced enough to make
reliable predictions about future behavior based on current brain structure and activity.
354. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (stating "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation").
355. DOIDGE, supra note 120, at xx.
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With regard to prison reform, conditions of incarceration should take
into account that adult brains change in response to environmental stimu-
lus. We have some foundational knowledge about how environment im-
proves brain development. For children and adolescents, identifiable "neu-
rological prerequisites desired to foster cognitive, behavioural, and inter-
personal competencies" include "nutrition, rest, a stimulating and loving
environment; ample opportunity to observe prosocial behavior; consistent
rewards for the incremental development of self-regulation and empathy
for others; a childhood free from physical violence and access to toxic
substances."3 16 It is likely that similar prerequisites foster social, cognitive,
and emotional competencies in adults. The image that comes to mind is of
the Norwegian prison, which looks more like a college campus than a
locked facility.3 57 Such comfort may offend the retributivist elements of
U.S. punishment that require infliction of discomfort and pain, but it com-
ports with evidence that environment contributes to shaping the person
and, as such, the state should be accountable for its role in shaping the
person who will one day be released.
The clearer we are about the implications of the science of adult
change, the clearer we can be about what we mean by rehabilitation. De-
pending on the context, rehabilitation has meant medical or psychological
care, vocational training, or moral reform. 35 8 At a more basic level, how-
ever, rehabilitation could imply simply providing environments that take
into account variables that affect "life-course trajectories" in people con-
victed of crimes. 3 5 9 Sometimes called "mechanisms of desistence," the
factors include: (1) situations that distinguish the present from the past; (2)
situations that provide social support and growth; (3) situations that
"change and structure routine activities;" and (4) situations that allow a
transformation of identity. 360 Accountability for contexts of change im-
plies shared responsibility for ensuring that the protective factors, factors
that lead to desistance from crime, are in place.
Nevertheless, I am skeptical of prison reform given incarceration's
baseline function of separating people convicted of crimes from family
and other meaningful social contexts, like work and community. Modem
prisons are, after all, designed to punish through deprivation, not to reha-
bilitate.3 61 More broadly, adoption of the belief that adults continue to
356. Clair Nee & Zarah Vernham, Expertise and its Contribution to the Notion of Protective
Factors in Offender Rehabilitation and Desistance, 32 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 37, 40
(2016).
357. See Amelia Gentleman, Inside Halden, The Most Humane Prison in the World, GUARDIAN
(May 18, 2012, 4:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/may/18/halden-most-humane-
prison-in-world.
358. Flanders, supra note 106, at 388-403, 419-20. Chad Flanders offers a useful taxonomy for
the Supreme Court's differing perspectives on rehabilitation: therapeutic, training, and moral reform.
359. See Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course View of the Development of Crime,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. of POL. & Soc. Scl., Nov. 2005, at 12, 15-16.
360. Id. at 17-18.
361. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011) (interpreting federal law to prohibit "im-
posing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender's rehabilitation.").
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change throughout life in response to their environment supports a prison
abolitionist ethic. As Allegra McLeod explains, the abolitionist ethic is
oriented toward responding to social harm through means other than crim-
inal punishment.36 2
Scholarship on prison abolition abounds, and much of it is beyond
the scope of this Article.36 3 But, as McLeod suggests, a first step could be
to shift our primary focus away from punishing crime and toward preven-
tive interventions outside of the prison walls.36 4 While multiple sources
confirm that impoverished neighborhoods are associated with higher rates
of mental health issues and criminal offending, 3 6 5 newer studies have
demonstrated the effectiveness of neighborhood-based interventions.
Providing housing for homeless people, for example, has been shown to
reduce rates of criminal offending.3 66 Improving conditions in neighbor-
hoods also has been shown to reduce homicides.3 6 7
A recent Brookings Institute study lends support to the theory of the
community-based response to crime. 3 6 8 Analyzing data on employment
rates before and after incarceration, the study noted that incarcerated peo-
ple had low employment rates before incarceration. While the study aimed
to examine the effect of tax incentives for hiring ex-felons, it inadvertently
showed that family backgrounds of extreme hardship, followed by low or
no employment in adulthood, predicts higher incarceration rates.369 Its data
strongly suggest that pre-incarceration investment in impoverished com-
munities to create educational and vocational opportunities is likely to re-
duce incarceration rates. 37 0
This Section has employed the science of adult change as a critique
of incapacitation, and to demonstrate the incompatibility of incarceration
with the goals of rehabilitation and specific deterrence. Other aspects of
362. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1161 (2015).
363. See, for example, Harvard Law Review's 2019 Symposium on Prison Abolition and related
articles, including Patrice Cullers, Abolition and Reparations: Histories ofResistance, Transformative
Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (2019); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abo-
lition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2019); Dylan Rodriguez, Abolition as Praxis ofHuman
Being: A Forward, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (2019); Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite ofPrison, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 1650 (2019).
364. McLeod, supra note 362, at 1167-68.
365. Rates of reoffense, for example, are strongly correlated to the neighborhood to which the
defendant returns after incarceration. Gerald J. Stahler et al., Predicting Recidivism for Released State
Prison Offenders: Examining the Influence ofIndividual and Neighborhood Characteristics and Spa-
tial Contagion on the Likelihood ofReincarceration, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 690, 694 (2013).
366. See Julian M. Somers et al., Housing First Reduces Re-offending Among Formerly Home-
less Adults with Mental Disorders: Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial, 8 PLOS ONE, no. 9,
Sept. 4, 2013, at 8.
367. See Allison J. Culyba et al., Modifiable NeighborhoodFeatures Associated with Adolescent
Homicide, 170 J. AM. MED. ASS'N PEDIATRICS 473, 479 (2016).
368. See generally ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WORK AND
OPPORTUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION (2018).
369. See id. at 19.
370. Id.
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sentencing, of course, are not directly challenged by my arguments, in-
cluding the retributivist goal of punishment insofar as it aims to provide a
moral answer to culpable actions and social harm.
This Section also articulated sentencing principles empirically in-
formed by the science of adult change. First, the principle of inclusion, and
reticence to permanently condemn, should lead to a commitment to only
provisional judgments about character and risk, even in cases of serious
crime. Second, the principle of accountability for the contexts of crime
suggests both critical analysis of the state's contribution to crime, through
its rumining prison conditions,and, also, a hopeful project of creating envi-
ronments that support neuropsychological repair. The specific recommen-
dations discussed have limitations, which points to the need for further
development of a cohesive theory of sentencing that does not rely on ex-
clusionary practices.
CONCLUSION
The survey of scientific literature discussed in Part II could lead to
another conclusion: Sentencing policy should never be based on incapac-
itation because we cannot accurately predict future behavior. Others have
taken this position, and it is defensible. 37 1 My guess, however, is that it
would be psychologically impossible not to consider public safety in sen-
tencing. If concern for the defendant's future risk of reoffense is intuitively
part of sentencing, then the task is to make sure that our underlying as-
sumptions are not grossly distorted by folk beliefs about characterological
criminality. Decisions to incapacitate and exclude should be minimal and
subject to reconsideration.
To be sure, evaluating sentencing policy in light of scientific claims
presents risks. First, there is the risk that the science is wrong, or that the
law's interpretation of the science is wrong.3 72 Optimists about predictive
sentencing, for example, hope that risk assessment practices can be im-
proved to reduce "false positive" results-incapacitating people who do
not pose a public safety threat.373 But, as discussed earlier in this Article,
long-term predictions are inaccurate, due, in part, to the instability of per-
sonality and behavior over time and in response to new experience.3 74 And,
371. See Michael Tonry, Predictions of Dangerousness at Sentencing: Deja vu All Over Again,
in 48 CRIME & JUSTICE-A REVIEW of the RESEARCH: AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS
AND WHY? 439, 472 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2019).
372. In discussing how juvenile neuroscience has been used to influence legislative changes in
juvenile justice, Francis Shen notes the difference in "neuronarratives" between "lab science" and
"lobbyist science." Shen, supra note 74, at 999, 1013.
373. Tonry, supra note 371, at 472-76.
374. See supra Part III.A. Discussions of whether future behavior can be predicted from brain
architecture face the same challenge. If brains change in response to experience, the architecture of
the brain will change over time. To be sure, obvious brain damage can often be correlated with behav-
ioral changes, but the relationship between brain architecture and behavior probably differs among
individuals. Stephan J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509, 520 (2013) ("[I]t is
extremely unlikely that the relation between the brain and behavior will be invariant in groups or
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it is all too easy to find other examples of pseudoscience-now de-
bunked-used to mark a group of people as prone to dangerousness and
criminality.3 75
The scientific claim I hold up in this Article is, however, much more
general and cautionary. Far from conclusory, the aspects of research that I
have highlighted have the effect of reducing our certainty in prediction and
increasing attention to empirical evidence of how prison and social condi-
tions change brains. 3 76 The limits of neuroplasticity, to say nothing of the
variables influencing it, are still largely unknown. It is thus not a particu-
larly conclusory position that I take about the science, and it is a position
that permits substantial revision. 3 7 7
In her critique of juvenile justice advocates' embrace of juvenile
brain science after Roper and Graham, Terry Maroney raises the above
concerns and also mounts a more fundamental challenge: that a gesture to
scientific findings could displace the essential work of identifying norma-
tive commitments in punishment theory. 3 7 8 Sentencing decisions are based
on values, and science does not create values.3 79 I agree that science cannot
steer sentencing judgment. Once the value has been identified, however,
empirical data can demonstrate a mismatch between the values and prac-
tice. Thus, if incapacitation is an acceptable goal of sentencing, incapaci-
tative punishments should not exceed their public safety goals.38 o
individuals. The brain is always changing, and the brain-environment interaction is powerful. The
causal relation between the brain and behavior is going to be exceptionally complex, variable, and
mediated by non-neural variables.").
375. Consider, for example, the pernicious use of the destructive pseudoscience of eugenics.
Laura I. Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History of Eugenics and
Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 436-61 (2018).
376. Even scholars critical of the law's overexuberant embrace of neuroscience are tentatively
supportive of the idea that neuroscience successfully demonstrates that some rules, doctrines, and pol-
icy in criminal law are based on incorrect folk beliefs about human thinking and behavior. Morse,
supra note 23, at 72.
377. Of more general concern, however, may be that I am unwittingly selecting only the science
that fits with my agenda. In an exercise of "motivated reasoning" I may have selected only studies that
fit my point. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Con-
stitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19 (2011). If the cognitive scientists are correct about the un-
conscious nature of motivated reasoning, it is unlikely that I will be able to ascertain the degree of my
bias. I am not positioned to evaluate this concern, and, therefore, must leave it to the reader except to
say that I have included studies offering a contrary position in Part II. In particular, I have noted the
studies of Moffitt, Taxonomy, supra note 132, at 674, who developed theory of "life-course persistent"
offenders, studies that Justice Thomas relied upon in his dissent in, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
117-119 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
378. See Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 765, 792 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Brain Science After Graham]; Terry A. Maroney, The
False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 172
(2009) [hereinafter Maroney, False Promise].
379. See Maroney, False Promise, supra note 378, at 172.
380. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 232 (1973)
("[P]]hilosophical theories are in peril if they are constructed in disregard of the nature of the empirical
world in which they are supposed to apply.").
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The science of adult change should not steer sentencing, but, rather,
should support the values in sentencing.3 8' This Article suggests empiri-
cally grounded principles upon which to critique current theory and build
a new theory. The brutality of both the practice of imprisonment and the
conditions of confinement stand in stark contrast to our commitment to
provide the circumstances in which people can change for the better. It is
a moral problem informed by folk beliefs about people that are not empir-
ically informed. The empirical problem is that we are wrong in thinking
we know who should be permanently incapacitated and who is incapable
of rehabilitation. This leads to a moral problem of discarding people by
permanently stigmatizing and condemning them based on an inaccurate
folk belief that they are characterologically criminal. While embracing the
science of adult change can serve the utilitarian objectives of rehabilitation
and public safety, it also supports a "moral orientation" toward imagining
responses to crime that aim to reintegrate, rather than permanently ex-
clude, and to realistically account for and change the conditions of punish-
ment.382
381. See Maroney, Brain Science After Graham, supra note 378, at 792 (concluding that the
science may "contribute, though marginally, to legislatures' and courts' recommitment to juvenile
justice values.").
382. McLeod, supra note 362, at 1160-68.
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